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TAX FERRETS, TAX CONSULTANTS, BOUNTY HUNTERS, AND
HIRED GUNS: THE PROPERTY TAX NETHERWORLD FUELED BY
CONTINGENCY FEES AND CHAMPERTOUS AGREEMENTS
J. LYN ENTRIKIN *
[T]he assessment process (and the property taxation dependent on it) is
widely vulnerable to corruption and inequity. 1
It is suggested that the tax ferrets are sources of annoyance and disturbance, and their powers should not be extended. There is, no doubt, a certain class of citizens who view the tax ferret from the same standpoint
that those who honestly list their property for taxation view the tax dodger; but the existence of the latter has created the necessity of the former.
About all which is appropriate to say is that, had we never had the tax
dodger, we would have had no necessity for the tax ferret. 2

INTRODUCTION
The property tax is by far the single most important source of revenue
for local governments in the United States. 3 For the four quarters ending on
March 31, 2013, state and local governments collected an estimated
$477.773 billion in property taxes, representing slightly more than one
third of all state and local government revenue for that time period.4 Annual property tax collections by state and local governments exceed combined

* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. The
author acknowledges with appreciation the research grant support provided by William H. Bowen
School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, and the excellent research assistance of Riley
Graber. Professor Sarah Howard Jenkins reviewed an early version of the article and provided helpful
comments. The central theme of this article germinated during the author’s service as an appointee to
the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals from 1996 to 1999.
1. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2070 (1985).
2. Osage & Okla. Cnty. v. Millard, 145 P. 797, 801 (Okla. 1915) (Riddle, J., dissenting).
3. Over the last thirty years, property taxes have consistently represented approximately threefourths of total annual local tax revenues. See Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due
Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 755 (2000); URBAN INSTITUTE & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TAX POLICY
CENTER, LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOCAL TAX REVENUE, SELECTED
YEARS 1977-2010 (2013), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/
dqs_table_84.pdf.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE & LOCAL TAX REVENUE (2013),
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/.
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individual and corporate state income taxes by well more than $100 billion. 5
Because property owners annually transfer substantial tax dollars to
state and local governments, a financial incentive exists for opportunists to
step in. Taxpayers and local governments alike are vulnerable to largely
unregulated agents whose livelihoods depend on a share of the annual cash
transfer of property tax dollars from property owners to local government
coffers. Third parties magnify the problem when they enter into contracts
with local officials and taxpayers for services in return for contingency
fees. 6 As a result, a substantial portion of the revenue that could be generated by the property tax base to finance public services is effectively diverted to private third parties, to the detriment of taxpayers and local
governments alike.
Because budgeted local government expenditures require financing
regardless of the allocation of the property tax burden among property
owners, the diversion of a substantial share of potential property tax revenue to private third parties effectively increases the tax burden for all owners of taxable property, including those who voluntarily pay their taxes
without protest, dispute, or appeal. At the same time, the diversion of property tax dollars to private third parties to facilitate correction of overassessments enhances the relative advantage already enjoyed by property
owners whose assessed values are understated, and who therefore have no
reason to appeal.
This article attempts to focus scholarly attention on this longstanding
public policy challenge, as well as the efforts a few states have undertaken
to mitigate the perverse financial incentives that have allowed these issues
to persist. 7 Surprisingly, legal scholars have not addressed most of these
5. See id.
6. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, New Revenue, New Concerns: Contingency Fee
Contracts Are Becoming Hot, But Have Their Limits, GOVERNING (Mar. 2013),
http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/New-Revenue-New-Concerns.html.
7. Only a few commentators have addressed the legal issues related to third-party contracts
between local taxing jurisdictions and property tax auditors. See Billy Hamilton, This Gun for Hire: The
Emerging Fight over Contingent-Fee Auditing, TAX ANALYSIS 533, 538 (Nov. 21, 2011) (referring to
“Magic 8-Ball bounty hunters”); Jerrold F. Janata, Dealing with Property Tax Audits and the Added
Burden of Third-Party Examiners, 6 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 100 (July/August 1996);
Eric S. Tresh, et al., Hard Times and Hired Guns in Local Tax Audits, STATE TAX NOTES 741 (Dec. 7,
2009). No legal scholarship has been located that addresses the consumer protection and public policy
issues associated with the virtually ubiquitous practice of non-attorney property tax consultants who
represent property owners for contingency fees. In contrast, the legitimacy of contingency fees paid to
attorneys, a highly regulated profession, has been a frequent subject of scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (1995); Allison F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 755
(1992).
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complex issues, notwithstanding their proliferation over the past century in
state courts, legislatures, and administrative tribunals. Property tax administration has always been an important public policy issue because when
poorly administered, the tax loses legitimacy with taxpayers.8 And the
property tax affects virtually everyone, whether as owners of taxable property or as beneficiaries of local services and public education primarily
financed by the property tax. Moreover, the administration of the property
tax, like any other state or federal tax, has important constitutional implications. 9
Part I provides background on the advantages and disadvantages of
the property tax as a revenue source for local government and offers a general overview of the state and local property assessment and appeal process. Part II addresses the ethical and legal issues associated with the
practice of local governments contracting with private auditors, historically
known as “tax ferrets,” to identify and assess escaped or undervalued taxable property. Part III addresses the legal, ethical, and consumer protection
issues involving the virtually nationwide business of property tax consulting. Part IV addresses legal and ethical constraints on contingency fee
compensation agreements with non-lawyers. Part V discusses selected
states’ statutory and regulatory regimes for regulating property tax consultants, and demonstrates that even in the most progressive states, oversight of
the property tax consulting business is lacking. Part VI concludes. Appendix A provides a state-by-state overview identifying those states that prohibit or restrict contracts between local taxing authorities and private
auditors; states that regulate or restrict the practice of property tax consultants; and states that limit or prohibit contingency fee agreements with either tax ferrets, tax consultants, or both. Appendix B includes
representative examples of form agreements by which property tax consultants contract with both business and residential property owners.
I. THE PROPERTY TAX AS A LOCAL FUNDING SOURCE
During economic recessions, property values are historically less vulnerable to significant fluctuations than individual and corporate income.10
For that reason, ad valorem property taxes offer a stabilizing influence on

8.
9.

HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? A NEW VIEW 94 (1975).
See, e.g., David C. Long, The Property Tax and the Courts: School Finance After Rodriguez,
in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 85-105 (George E. Peterson ed., 1973).
10. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future Property Tax: A Dialog with My Younger Self,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2202 (2002) (discussing the relative inelasticity of property taxes as compared to income taxes).
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state and local government revenues. 11 On the other hand, ownership of
taxable property in contemporary United States does not correlate nearly as
well with personal wealth 12 as it once did in the agricultural and industrial
economy that characterized the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.13
Property taxes have historically evoked disdain and resistance from taxpayers as compared to state and federal income taxes, 14 perhaps because of
their salience as annually recurring compulsory government levies on the
values of homes and businesses. 15 Moreover, property owners infrequently
realize the fair market value of their homes and businesses, so imposing an
annual tax levy as a percentage of assessed value poses a particularly striking financial burden on property owners who lack a stable and recurring
source of income. 16
Despite the political controversies associated with the property tax and
the recurring criticisms concerning its uneven administration, 17 the property tax as a primary source of local government revenue is likely here to
stay. 18 In particular, public elementary and secondary education in the

11. Id. at 2208 & n.16; see ABA PROPERTY TAX DESKBOOK v (2012); infra note 29 (defining ad
valorem).
12. AARON, supra note 8, at 1-2 (ownership of taxable real property is not closely correlated with
other indicia of income and wealth, and property tax liability is a poor index of public services provided
to residential and business taxpayers).
13. See Arthur D. Lynn, The Institutional Context of Property Tax Administration, in THE
PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 3, 7 (Arthur D. Lynn, ed., 1969) (ad valorem property tax
developed “when agriculture was predominant, transportation and communication primitive, government decentralized, international commitments minimal, and the public sector relatively small”). Historically, the property tax focused on land and its production value. Richard Henry Carlson, A Brief
History of Property Tax, FAIR & EQUITABLE 3 (Feb. 2005).
14. AARON, supra note 8, at 68 (“The property tax remains one of the most unpopular taxes in the
United States . . . .”); GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? 4 (1996). For a brief but scholarly overview
of the history of the property tax including its ancient European antecedents, see Arthur D. Lynn,
Property Tax Development: Selected Historical Perspectives, in PROP. TAX’N – USA 7-19 (Richard W.
Lindholm ed., 1969).
15. In contrast, state and federal income taxes for individual taxpayers are primarily collected and
remitted to the government by employers. Self-employed individuals, businesses, and corporations pay
quarterly estimated taxes. The fact that state and local income taxes are rarely paid in an annual lump
sum reduces the shock value of the annual tax burden. The same buffering effect occurs when homeowners escrow property taxes and the escrow agent pays them annually or semi-annually. See ABA
PROPERTY TAX DESKBOOK vi (2012). But the property tax remains the most salient of taxes for most
taxpayers.
16. Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2201-01; see AARON, supra note 8, at 3 (“Because most real
property is not sold each year but market values continually change, it is difficult to define fairness and
equity in the administration of property tax, let alone apply them.”).
17. See Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2200 n.2.
18. AARON, supra note 8, at 92, 95; Alexander, supra note 3, at 748; see Zelinsky, supra note 10,
at 2200. “Today, even the most casual observer of local finance understands that the property tax continues to play a critical role [in] funding municipal services, particularly public education.” Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2201 (property tax remains viable because of its “distinct theoretical and
practical advantages”). For a comprehensive state-by-state overview of the distribution of the state and
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United States is the constitutional responsibility of state government, and it
is largely financed by local property taxes. 19 In order to displace reliance
on the property tax as a major financing source for public education, states
would have the ominous task of identifying alternative sources of significant revenue.20 And for all its vices, the property tax has the major advantage of enforceability. 21 In each of the fifty states, unpaid property taxes
attach as a priority lien on the property, allowing the taxing jurisdiction to
eventually foreclose, conduct a forced tax sale, and collect the back taxes.22
Moreover, property taxes have an administrative advantage because of the
visibility of real estate and its fixed situs in each local taxing jurisdiction.23
Finally, property taxes enhance political accountability because local elected officials annually determine the local tax rates necessary to finance
budgeted expenditures required to provide local government services. 24
A. The Uniformity Principle
At least in theory, the underlying principle of property taxation administration is uniformity. Beginning in the early to mid-nineteenth century,
state constitutions typically required assessment 25 of all taxable property at
a uniform percentage of value, yielding the same effective tax rate.26 Even

local tax burden, see SUSAN PACE HAMILL, AS CERTAIN AS DEATH: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF STATE
AND LOCAL TAX LAWS (2007).
19. Alexander, supra note 3, at 755; Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2200. As one scholar noted, the
relative importance of the property tax diminishes to the extent that states accept financial responsibility
for an increasingly large share of financing for public elementary and secondary education. AARON,
supra note 8, at 92.
20. DIANE B. PAUL, THE POLITICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 3 (1975) (“To abolish, or even significantly reduce, the burden of the property tax some other tax or taxes would have to be substantially
increased.”).
21. FISHER, supra note 14, at 120; Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2217. But cf. Alexander, supra note
3, at 748 (warning that tax collection is not for the faint-hearted).
22. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 761.
23. Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2209 n.20, 2216-20 (highlighting the virtues of the property tax).
24. Id. at 2208.
25. “Assessment” is not limited to the valuation of property. “It includes the whole statutory
mode of imposing the tax. It embraces all the proceedings for raising money by the exercise of the
power of taxation from the inception to the conclusion of the proceedings.” Jackson Lumber Co. v.
McCrimmon, 164 F. 759, 763-64 (N.D. Fla. 1908); see Kenneth Back, Potential for Organizational
Improvement of Property Tax Administration, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra
note 13, at 38-39 (summarizing major aspects of the assessment function, including defending assessments on appeal).
26. See AARON, supra note 8, at 57 (“In most taxing jurisdictions, the law requires all properties
to be taxed at the same effective tax rate.”); FISHER, supra note 14, at 56-61, tbl.4.3 (discussing origin
and spread of uniformity principle and state constitutional uniformity provisions). Many jurisdictions
assess property at a fixed percentage of its fair market value and then apply a nominal tax rate to the
assessed value. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (7th ed. 1999). Because states vary widely as to
their assessment ratios for different property classifications, a more representative measure of a proper-
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those state constitutions that have since been amended to provide for different classifications such as residential, industrial, and agricultural property 27 require assessment within each class at a uniform rate. 28
In general, some defined measure of property value is the theoretical
foundation for achieving the abstract goal of uniformity in assessment. 29 In
most states, “fair market value,” sometimes known as “full value,” is the
statutorily defined measure of taxable property value, calculated by estimating what the property would sell for in an arm’s length transaction.30
“Appraisal” is the process of determining the valuation of property within a
local jurisdiction for tax assessment purposes. 31 For economic, political,
and many other reasons, local jurisdictions vary widely in terms of the
accuracy of the appraisal process. 32 For example, appraisal practice is highly dependent on the accuracy of local data regarding actual sales of real
property. 33 Moreover, for jurisdictions that include personal property in the
tax base, accurate reporting relies heavily on the cooperation of taxpay-

ty owner’s tax burden is the effective tax rate, which is calculated by dividing the annual tax liability of
the property by its fair market value.
27. See Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2212-13 (classification schemes in prototypical form explicitly divide all taxed properties into different categories, each with its own effective tax rate). Classification is often a political solution to the historical tendency for residential and agricultural property to be
substantially undervalued compared to commercial and industrial property. See generally FISHER, supra
note 14, at 174-79 (describing background of 1989 Kansas constitutional amendment that substituted
classification for uniform property taxation).
28. AARON, supra note 8, at 57; FISHER, supra note 14, at 188 (“Uniformity within classes is still
required.”); see also State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ind.
1998).
29. Because property taxes are largely imposed as a fraction of the subject property’s value, they
are often known as ad valorem taxes. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53, 1469 (7th ed. 1999).
30. Columbus Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 983 N.E.2d 1285, 129293 (Ohio 2012) (defining arm’s length transaction for tax valuation purposes); AARON, supra note 8, at
14. In an “arm’s-length” transaction, unrelated parties are presumed to have roughly equal bargaining
power, with neither under duress to enter into the transaction. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 103 (7th
ed. 1999).
31. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 97 (7th ed. 1999).
32. The coefficient of dispersion is a measure of accuracy of the appraisal process in any jurisdiction. See AARON, supra note 8, at 92; John D. Cole, The Effect of Electronic Data Processing upon
Property Tax Administration, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 13, at 45,
49; see also PAUL, supra note 20, at 5. For any tax year, calculating the coefficient of dispersion requires identifying all property within a taxing jurisdiction that is sold in arm’s-length transactions, and
then averaging the percentage deviation between each property’s assessed value and its actual selling
price.
33. “[A]ppraising much real property is time-consuming, fairly subjective and ultimately manipulable.” Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2219 (noting difficulty of determining fair market value absent actual
sales). Because the accuracy of the assessment process depends largely on the analysis of property sales
data, taxing jurisdictions with larger populations (and consequently more sales) tend to have substantially lower coefficients of dispersion. See AARON, supra note 8, at 16, tbl.2-4; Cole, supra note 32, at
49; see also Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2203.
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ers. 34 For these and other reasons, the ad valorem nature of the property
tax, as a means of equalizing the tax burden among property owners, poses
challenges for equitable implementation. 35
Even within the constraints of generally accepted appraisal practices,
appraisal is as much art as science.36 Much of the criticism leveled at the
property tax focuses on the inaccuracy of the fair market value determination. Although a number of laudable efforts have been made to develop
guidelines for appraising property, 37 professional judgment remains a significant factor. 38
B. The Property Tax Assessment and Appeal Process
Taxable property is generally assessed in the first instance by the local
taxing jurisdiction. 39 Property owners receive a notice of assessment 40 each
year on or before a statutorily specified date. The property owner generally
has a relatively short timeframe, often thirty days, to initiate an informal
appeal of the local assessor’s valuation determination. Many assessment
disputes are resolved informally at this initial step. While the appeals process varies widely from state to state, 41 typically the property owner has an
34. See, e.g., Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfr’s Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ind. 2003) (Indiana
businesses annually self-report taxable personal property, which represents a substantial portion of the
tax base); see also Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2218 (personal property tax poses challenges in enforcement because taxpayers can easily move personalty when the tax collector comes looking for it).
35. See Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2203. “The determination of the fair market value of property
subject to taxation is one of the most difficult, and most controversial, aspects of the administration of
the real property tax.” Alexander, supra note 3, at 752, n.11.
36. Cole, supra note 32, at 48 (“[A]ppraisals are now and always will be the opinions of men, and
perhaps never will be truly scientific . . . .”).
37. See, e.g., APPRAISAL FOUNDATION, Bylaws art. III § 3.01 (Nov. 2012) (purpose of Foundation, among other things, is “[t]o establish and improve uniform appraisal standards by defining, issuing
and promoting such standards”), available at https://appraisalfoundation.sharefile.com/download.
aspx?id=s0ff82f963e64035b.
38. Brief for Institute of Property Taxation, as Brief of Amicus Curiae on Petition for Certiorari,
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Cabarrus Cnty., No. 93-1710, at 4; see CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT PRACTICES SURVEY (June 2013) (referring to “inherently subjective
nature of the assessment process”); PAUL, supra note 20, at 8 (“Assessing, like police work, is both
discretionary and subjective, combining constant temptation with minimal likelihood of exposure.”).
39. In many states, unusually complex property, such as public utilities and railroads, is assessed
at the state level. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-102(m) (2013); see also Osage & Okla. Co. v.
Millard, 145 P. 797, 799 (Okla. 1915) (authority of counties to hire tax ferrets to identify undervalued
or omitted property did not extend to state-assessed properties).
40. The assessment is the assessor’s determination of value multiplied by the assessment rate for
that classification of property. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (defining “assessment”). Each
state determines a “lien date,” generally January 1 of the current tax year, which establishes a fixed date
for the purpose of determining each property’s taxable value.
41. See, e.g., In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Tenn. 1995) (summarizing Tennessee’s ad
valorem tax appeal process). See generally ABA PROPERTY TAX DESKBOOK v (2012) (briefly describing property tax valuation and appeal process in each state).
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opportunity to appeal the local assessor’s final valuation decision to a local
board of equalization, which may be composed of local elected officials or
their appointees. 42 If the property owner elects to appeal from the decision
of the local equalization board, the next step is to seek review by the state
board of equalization, in some states known as a board of review or a tax
commission. The state board of equalization may be organized as a division
of the state department of revenue, a separate administrative board, or an
administrative tax court.43
If the property owner remains aggrieved by the assessment after exhausting these administrative avenues, the next step is to seek judicial review, generally by a district or circuit court.44 As a general rule, judicial
review is not de novo; instead, the court reviews the record of the tax proceeding before one of the administrative tribunals, usually the state board
of equalization, including expert witness reports and testimony. In addition
to the administrative record, reviewing courts consider written and oral
arguments by the parties to the tax appeal. 45 Depending on state statutes,
the state board of equalization may or may not be a party to the judicial
appeal.
From the district or circuit court level, the property owner may pursue
an appeal through the state court system. Relatively few assessment appeals
reach the state appellate courts, in part because judicial standards of appellate review are highly deferential to the specialized fact finding process of
administrative tax tribunals, 46 and often opinions of value come down to a
battle of the experts. Moreover, the economic and political incentives are

42. While the assessment appeal process is primarily designed to ensure the accuracy of the
valuation process, most taxpayers who initiate an appeal are less concerned with the accuracy of the
valuation than they are with the “bottom line”—the amount of their annual property tax bill. Richard R.
Almy, Rationalizing the Assessment Process, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 175, 177 (George E. Peterson
ed., 1973). Once all property is assessed, the governing body determines the tax rate, usually measured
in mills, to apply to assessed property to generate the revenues required to finance local budgeted
expenditures for the ensuing year. A mill is one dollar for each thousand dollars in assessed value, or
put another way, one tenth of one percent of the property’s assessed value.
43. For an excellent overview and critique of one state’s administrative property tax assessment
and appeal process, see Gage A. Rohlf, Note, Kansas Property Tax Appeals: An Adversarial System
Without Adversaries, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 871 (2010). See also Robert R. Gunning, Property Tax Litigation Before the Board of Assessment Appeals, 35 COLO. LAW. 87 (Aug. 2006). Local and state boards of
equalization, however denominated, are quasi-judicial administrative tribunals established by statute;
they are not courts. E.g., Grand Partners Joint Venture I v. Realtax Res., Inc., 483 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997).
44. In some states, an appeal from the state board of equalization is taken to the intermediate
court of appeals.
45. One exception is Alaska. Because no state administrative appeal tribunal exists, property
owners whose valuation disputes are not resolved locally may thereafter seek judicial review. See
ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.200(c) (2012).
46. E.g., Mich. Props., LLC v. Meridian Twp., 817 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Mich. 2012).
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substantial for parties to reach a settlement, or more specifically a stipulated value, before the case reaches the courts.
C. Primary Players in the Property Tax System
Local Assessors. Appointed by elected county, township, or municipal
government officials in some states and directly elected in others, local
assessors have the arduous (and politically charged) responsibility of periodically appraising property for ad valorem tax purposes. While the frequency of the reappraisal process varies widely from state to state, the
initial responsibility falls on the shoulders of local appraisers, usually salaried employees of the taxing jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the educational and professional credentials of local
assessors vary widely based on a number of factors, including the population base of the local jurisdiction and the willingness of local officials to
provide a reasonable salary and supporting staff for the assessor’s office. 47
Over the last two decades, the development and refinement of mass appraisal techniques, which rely heavily on computer technology and property sales data, have greatly facilitated the accuracy and efficiency of the
appraisal process. 48 Yet the ongoing responsibility to accurately appraise
property for tax purposes remains a difficult task, made even more challenging by the inherently political context of local government.
One of the ongoing challenges for local assessors is identifying “escaped” or significantly undervalued property. For example, if a new industrial building has been constructed on a parcel of vacant land since the
previous valuation, or if a parcel of agricultural land on the outskirts of a
developing metropolitan area has been subdivided for residential development, the parcel’s fair market value will have increased substantially relative to the values of other property in the taxing jurisdiction. If the assessor
is unaware of these improvements and appraises the property at the same
value as the prior tax year, the marginal increase in property value eludes
or “escapes” taxation, and the increment of the property tax burden that
should be shouldered by the newly developed property is unwittingly shifted to every other property owner in the same taxing jurisdiction. In addition, the mobility of personal property in states that tax it allows owners to

47. A few jurisdictions require minimum educational credentials for candidates for the elective
office of municipal tax assessor. E.g., Alongi v. Schatzman, 274 A.2d 33, 40-41 (N.J. 1971) (upholding
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:1-35.25, requiring graduation from four-year educational institution).
48. But see Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 2209 n.20 (expressing skepticism that computer-assisted
appraisal techniques remedy deficiencies in the appraisal process).

298

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

evade tax simply by moving or hiding the property, in addition to the problem of chronic underreporting.
Tax Ferrets. Over the last century, many local jurisdictions have periodically contracted with private parties to help identify escaped or undervalued property to ensure that all taxable property is accurately valued and
assessed. 49 In modern parlance, local taxing officials have long engaged in
“outsourcing” the process of identifying and appraising undervalued property. 50 Historically, private contractors who performed this service for local
governments were known as tax “ferrets” because their task was to ferret
out undervalued or escaped taxable property. 51 The practice originated in
Roman times in the form of “tax farming;” 52 ancient governments sold the
right to assess and collect taxes to third parties in exchange for cash, which
had the benefit of advancing funds to the taxing jurisdiction without the
related expense of administering the tax system. 53
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contracts outsourcing tax appraisal work to private parties 54 typically provided for compensation based on a contingency fee, calculated as a percentage of the additional
49. JOHN K. BRINDLEY JR., HISTORY OF TAXATION IN IOWA 310-11 (1911); John L. Coalson &
Kendall L. Houghton, Do Multijurisdictional Contingent-Fee Audits Violate Due Process?, 8 J.
MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 220, 220 (1998). The Brindley treatise offers a fascinating account
of the tax ferret system in Iowa over a century ago. BRINDLEY, supra, at 310 (referring to tax ferrets as
“the storm center of much prejudice and controversy in recent years”). In the late nineteenth century,
“the heyday of the institution known as tax ferreting[,] the reporting of personal property was farmed
out to tax inquisitors on a commission contract. Generally, they left a trail of bitterness.” Harold M.
Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually and Practically Administrable?, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND
ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 13, at 15, 21.
50. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Town of Magnolia, 184 So. 59, 60 (Miss. 1938) (holding unenforceable a
contract providing 50% contingency fee for appellant’s assistance in putting certain railroad property on
local tax rolls).
51. Alexander, supra note 3, at 751, 759-60 (referring to practice of tax farming as “routinely
condemned” (citing E.A. Angell, The Tax Inquisitor System in Ohio, 5 YALE L.J. 350, 369 (1897)); see,
e.g., Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfr’s Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463, 464 & n.2 (Ind. 2003); Simpson v. Silver
Bow Cnty., 285 P. 195, 198 (Mont. 1930). See generally 16 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 44.102, 44.133 (3d. rev. ed. 2003).
52. Carlson, supra note 13, at 4.
53. Alexander, supra note 3, at 751. One scholar attributed the development of the tax ferret
system in Iowa to the “acknowledged failure of local assessment for certain classes of intangible property.” BRINDLEY, supra note 49, at 140. Brindley explained,
[F]or the most part those who secured contracts for this class of work were professional adventurers or “birds of passage” from other States, with no reputation to lose and perhaps one
to gain. In many cases they were not placed under bond. In fact, no law required them to give
bonds, the matter being entirely in the hands of county boards of supervisors. The commissions paid were in many cases exorbitant [as much as fifty percent of the amount recovered],
and . . . it was quite common for tax inquisitors from other States to make their visits, “skim
off the cream,” or, perhaps, “come to a mutual understanding” with some professional tax
dodger, hurry across the border and later return to a different county, there to repeat the process.
Id. at 312.
54. E.g., Wilhelm v. Cedar Cnty., 50 Iowa 254, 255 (1878).
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tax revenue recovered by the tax ferret. 55 The practice was condemned by
some courts, 56 generally reasoning that if statutes specifically conferred the
power and duty on local officials to identify escaped or undervalued property, the local governing body lacked power to contract with private parties
to conduct those government services. 57 Other courts reasoned that local
governments had the implied power to contract with tax ferrets, especially
if no local official had specific statutory authority to discover escaped or
undervalued taxable property. 58
Some states enacted statutes expressly or implicitly authorizing local
jurisdictions to enter into contracts with tax ferrets, 59 while others imposed
statutory constraints on the power of local jurisdictions to do so. 60
In Murphy v. Swanson, 61 the North Dakota Supreme Court identified
an independent basis for holding a tax ferret contract unenforceable, beyond the rationale that the county governing body acted beyond its legal
powers. The court reasoned that the contract was contrary to public policy
because it provided for a fixed proportion of additional taxes that might be
collected by the local government to be paid instead as compensation to the
tax ferret, effectively diverting public funds to a private party. The court
announced that “contracts of this character are contrary to a sound public
policy, and, unless expressly warranted by legislative authority, will not be
upheld.” 62

55. E.g., Shinn v. Cunningham, 94 N.W. 941, 941 (Iowa 1903) (citing IOWA CODE § 1374
(1897)); Fawcett v. Woodbury Cnty., 7 N.W. 483, 483 (Iowa 1880) (citing IOWA CODE § 303(4)
(1873)). For a comprehensive account of the tax ferret’s historical role in local taxation, see NICHOLAS
R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
1780-1940, at 191-220 (2013).
56. E.g., Murphy v. Swanson, 198 N.W. 116, 120 (N.D. 1924); Pierson v. Minnehaha Cnty., 134
N.W. 212, 215 (S.D. 1912). But see Fleener v. Litsey, 66 N.E. 82, 84 (Ind. App. 1903) (upholding
contingent fee agreements with tax ferrets as consistent with public policy favoring fair and equitable
taxation).
57. E.g., City of Richmond v. Dickinson, 58 N.E. 260, 261-62 (Ind. 1900); State ex rel. Coleman
v. Fry, 95 P. 392, 393 (Kan. 1908)); Grannis v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Blue Earth Cnty., 83 N.W. 495, 496
(Minn. 1900); see also Groves, supra note 49, at 21 (“Farming out tax administration is an ancient
expedient; the experience seems to demonstrate that the ethics of tax administration cannot be maintained except by public officials under oath to follow the law.”).
58. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Clifford, 103 N.E. 789, 791 (Ind. 1914); Disbrow v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Cass Cnty., 93 N.W. 585, 586 (Iowa 1903).
59. E.g., City of Richmond, 58 N.E. at 262 (citing 1891 amendment prohibiting local officials
from engaging assistants to identify omitted property); Fawcett, 7 N.W. at 483 (citing IOWA CODE
§ 303(4) (1873)).
60. Ingram v. Chappell, 260 P. 20, 21 (Okla. 1929) (Tax Ferret Act authorized appointment
limited to 15% contingency fee); cf. Decatur Cnty. v. Roberts, 126 S.E. 460, 460 (Ga. 1925) (statute
authorizing contracts for 10% contingency fee negated authority to contract for 25% fee).
61. 198 N.W. 116 (N.D. 1924).
62. Id. at 120 (citations omitted). But see Simpson v. Silver Bow Cnty., 285 P. 195, 198 (Mont.
1930) (contingent fee contract not against public policy).
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Tax Consultants. Just as local taxing authorities contract for services
with private third parties for tax auditing services, many businesses regularly outsource tax-related responsibilities traditionally undertaken by inhouse corporate property tax managers. 63 And owners of residential property, large and small, often seek assistance in disputing their assessed property values. Property tax consulting firms, sometimes holding themselves
out as “tax detectives” or “tax representatives,” actively solicit property
owners, often promoting their services at “no cost.” Some property tax
consulting firms make their form agreements available for download from
the firms’ websites. 64 These agreements generally provide for compensation based on a fixed percentage of the estimated “tax savings” achieved
for the property owner. 65
While the percentage varies, contingency fees between 30 and 50 percent of the estimated property tax savings are typical. Property tax consulting firms range in size, organization, and available services. 66 While
“seasoned ethical professionals” may be identified in all categories, one
corporate property tax manager has cautioned that some firms engage in
practices that “may be considered less than ethical.” 67 While reputable tax
consulting firms no doubt perform diligent, professional service whether
compensated on a fee-for-service, hourly, or contingent fee basis, contingent compensation agreements create incentives to engage in unethical
behavior. 68
By all accounts, tax consultants operate in a “highly unregulated business.” 69 A few states require anyone who prepares an appraisal to be licensed as an appraiser and prohibit contingency fee appraisals. 70 But in
most states, the services provided by property tax consultants do not qualify as “appraisals” as defined in statutes, and therefore those restrictions do
not apply. In the absence of regulation and oversight, history reflects that

63. See Michael D. Clark, The ABCs of Hiring a Property Tax Consultant, J. PROP. TAX MGMT.
18, 19 (Winter 1998) (“As long as there have been property tax consulting firms, there has been outsourcing.”).
64. For selected examples of tax consultant contingency fee agreements, see Appendix B.
65. Because their contingency fees are calculated based on an estimate of the tax “savings,”
property tax consultant contracts resemble agreements for “reverse contingency fees,” promoted by
some practitioners as an alternative to the “billable hour.” E.g., Jim O. Stuckey, II, “Reverse Contingency Fees”: A Potentially Profitable and Professional Solution to the Billable Hour Trap, 16 PROF.
LAW., no. 3, 2005, at 25, 28.
66. Clark, supra note 63, at 21.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 26.
69. See, e.g., id. at 29, 32.
70. Id. at 29.
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some property tax firms have engaged in highly unethical and even criminal behavior. 71
Several organizations have been established over the years to develop
best practices in property appraisal, and to encourage professionalism and
ethical conduct among property tax assessors and consultants.72 However,
membership in professional organizations is largely voluntary, except in
the very few states where membership is a prerequisite for representing a
property owner. 73
II. THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROPRIETY OF CONTINGENCY FEE
CONTRACTS BETWEEN TAX ASSESSORS AND PRIVATE AUDITORS
A. Background
The policy issues inherent in contingency fee agreements between
government agencies and outside counsel are not new. During the mid1990s, several state attorneys general settled claims against the tobacco
industry that netted some fourteen billion dollars nationwide in legal fees,
raising a number of ethical issues about the authority of governments to
contract with private parties for a percentage of the net recovery. 74 Among
other arguments, critics 75 have observed that the contingency fees paid in
the wake of the multi-billion dollar settlement effectively diverted public
funds to private attorneys. 76 Instead, the millions of dollars in contingency
fees paid to private counsel could have been used to offset Medicaid costs
71. Id. at 28-29; see, e.g., Agreed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 17, Texas v.
Patrick O’Connor & Assoc., LP, No. 2009-33833 (129th Dist. Tex. Oct. 14, 2010) ($800,000 settlement
of civil claims against property tax consulting firm alleging numerous deceptive business practices); see
also Ronald B. Welch, Property Taxation: Policy Potentials and Probabilities, in THE PROPERTY TAX
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 13, at 203, 205-06 (referring to California property tax reforms
in 1966 “after an assessment scandal had rocked the state”). See generally PAUL, supra note 20, at 91114 (case study of California property tax scandal and subsequent reform efforts).
72. Among others, these include the International Association of Assessing Officers, the Appraisal Foundation, the Institute for Professionals in Taxation, and the International Property Tax Institute.
Some have adopted Codes of Ethics to which their members subscribe. E.g., APPRAISAL STANDARDS
BOARD, UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE p. U-7 (2012-13), available at
http://www.uspap.org/#/28/.
73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.19(A)(1)(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
74. See Carson R. Griffis, Should States Ban Contingency Fee Agreements Between Attorneys
General and Private Attorneys?, 20 PROF. LAW. 22, 22-24 (2010) (while contingency fees paid by state
government to private counsel may facilitate cronyism and political patronage, they may also serve
legitimate public interests).
75. See, e.g., Leah Godesky, Note, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Arrangements:
An Affront to the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 626 (2009).
76. A few states have enacted legislation designed to curb the authority of attorneys general to
enter into contingency fee agreements with outside counsel. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.0155 (West
Supp. 2013); see also Griffis, supra note 74, at 23.
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for cigarette smokers borne by state taxpayers over many years, or to address the public health risks associated with cigarette smoking. Either
would have been a better use of the tobacco settlement proceeds for public
benefit. 77
More recently, taxpayers have challenged state and local governments
when they retain private counsel to assist in prosecuting public nuisance
claims and consumer protection violations. 78 For example, a group of California municipalities recently retained outside counsel to assist government
attorneys in a public nuisance action against manufacturers of lead-based
paint products. 79 The fee agreements with outside counsel provided for
compensation as a percentage of the net amount recovered, and generally
specified that government counsel would retain complete control over the
course of the litigation. 80
The defendant manufacturers unsuccessfully sought to bar the plaintiffs from hiring outside counsel under a contingency fee agreement. In
response, the court emphasized that the public nuisance action sought to
redress harm to the public, raising public policy concerns not applicable to
a typical civil action between private parties. 81 Nevertheless, the court
found “no indication that the contingent-fee arrangements . . . created a
danger of governmental overreaching or economic coercion.” 82 Therefore,
the court did not categorically bar contingency fee agreements. 83 However,
77. Griffis, supra note 74, at 22 (citing Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 975).
78. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 475 & n.50 (R.I. 2008); State ex rel.
Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 647-48 (W. Va. 2013). See generally David M.
Axelrad & Lisa Perrochet, The Supreme Court of California Rules on Santa Clara Contingency Fee
Issue - Backpedals on Clancy, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 331, 332-35 (2011) (contending that use of contingency fee counsel to enforce public rights creates appearance of impropriety and negatively affects
government integrity and neutrality). Very recently, a federal district court rejected a due process
challenge against the Kentucky Attorney General who had retained outside counsel on a contingency
fee arrangement to litigate alleged violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. See Merck
Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, CIV. A. 3:11-51-DCR, 2013 WL 2297179, at *5 (E.D. Ky. May 24,
2013). The court reasoned that the attorney general had “retained and exercised decision-making authority in the underlying litigation” sufficient to protect the defendant drug manufacturer’s due process
rights. Id. at *17.
79. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 25-26 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied sub nom.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 920 (2011). Retained counsel agreed to finance all
litigation costs beyond an initial contribution of $150,000 by Santa Clara County. Id. at 26-27. If successful, the private firms would recover their unreimbursed costs plus 17% of the net recovery, but if
unsuccessful, nothing. Id. at 27.
80. Id. at 40-41.
81. See id. at 34.
82. Id.
83. The court rejected defendants’ argument that contingency fee contracts with government
entities are inherently suspect, observing that “[c]ontingent-fee arrangements are deeply entrenched as a
legitimate and sometimes prudent method of delegating risk [to counsel] in the context of civil litigation . . . .” Id. at 39 n.14.
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because local governments undertook the civil litigation on behalf of the
public, the court invoked a “heightened standard of ethical conduct” in
considering the propriety of the fee agreements with private counsel.84
Applying this heightened scrutiny, the court concluded that the challenged
fee agreements passed muster under the circumstances. 85
The fact that outside counsel had agreed to work under the close supervision of in-house counsel reassured the court that government attorneys
would “place the interests of their client above the personal, pecuniary
interest of the subordinate private counsel they have hired.”86 The court
remanded for further proceedings to ensure that all contingency fee agreements with outside counsel adequately retained government control and
supervision of the litigation “to safeguard against abuse of the judicial process.” 87
Outsourcing public litigation to private counsel continues to be controversial. 88 Very recently, the West Virginia high court rejected a motion
to disqualify private counsel appointed by the state attorney general to
prosecute violations of state consumer protection laws against defendant’s
credit card services. 89 Although a West Virginia statute 90 authorizes appointment of assistant attorneys general only on the condition that their
compensation remain within the limits of appropriations, the court held that
the state attorney general retains common law power to appoint special
assistants and determine their compensation.91

84. Id. at 35. “[A] civil attorney acting on behalf of a public entity, in prosecuting a civil case
such as a public nuisance abatement action, is entrusted with the unique power of the government and
therefore must refrain from abusing that power by failing to act in an evenhanded manner.” Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 36.
86. Id. In particular, the court held that “retention agreements between public entities and private
counsel must specifically provide that decisions regarding settlement of the case are reserved exclusively to the discretion of the public entity’s own attorneys.” Id.
87. Id. at 41.
88. See, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, CIV. A. 3:11-51-DCR, 2013 WL
2297179, at *17 (E.D. Ky. May 24, 2013) (contingency-fee arrangement with outside counsel in consumer protection case did not violate due process); Int'l Paper Co. v. Harris Cnty., 01-12-00538-CV,
2013 WL 3864317, at *14 (Tex. Ct. App. July 25, 2013) (use of contingent-fee lawyers may allow
pursuit of complex, non-frivolous litigation government entity could not otherwise afford, and may
provide specialized expertise that government lawyers lack). But see Greater Ga. Amusements, LLC v.
State, 728 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (invalidating contingency fee agreement retaining
outside counsel to assist in prosecuting convenience stores for violating Georgia’s RICO Act); Amusement Sales, Inc. v. State, 730 S.E.2d 430, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (categorically disqualifying special
assistant district attorneys appointed on contingency agreement to prosecute in rem civil forfeiture
against commercial gambling machines).
89. State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 651 (W. Va. 2013).
90. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-3-3 (LexisNexis 2006).
91. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d at 648.
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Concerns about government retention of contingency fee counsel and
expertise are not limited to state and local governments. On May 18, 2007,
President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order92 generally prohibiting federal agencies from compensating attorneys and expert witnesses
based on contingency fees. 93 The order announced,
[I]t is the policy of the United States that organizations or individuals
that provide [legal and expert witness] services to or on behalf of the
United States shall be compensated in amounts that are reasonable, not
contingent upon the outcome of litigation or other proceedings, and established according to criteria set in advance of performance of the services, except when otherwise required by law. 94

The stated purpose of the Executive Order was “[t]o help ensure the integrity and effective supervision of the legal and expert witness services provided to or on behalf of the United States.”95 President Obama has not
rescinded the order, so it remains in effect.
Similar public policy and ethical concerns pertain when local government officials “outsource” auditing services to private parties in consideration for a contingency fee. 96 In a “contract audit,” the tax assessor engages
a third party to audit the books of a property owner, rather than assigning
the work to an employee of the assessor’s office. The fee paid to a contract
auditor may be a fixed fee or a percentage of any additional taxes recovered. 97 When local tax officials compensate outside auditors and accountants on a contingency fee arrangement, they divert a percentage of the
property taxes recovered to pay private parties rather than to finance public
services. 98
The potential for abuse is even greater when tax assessors contract
with private auditors to assist with the assessment function. Local tax officials are not attorneys, and most private auditors and accountants are not

92. Exec. Order No. 13,433, 3 C.F.R. 638 (2007).
93. Under the Order, federal agencies are barred from entering into contingency fee agreements
for legal or expert witness services unless required by law, as determined by the Attorney General. Id.
at § 2(b). Contingency fees are defined as “a contract or other agreement to provide services under
which the amount or the payment of the fee for the services is contingent in whole or in part on the
outcome of the matter for which the services were obtained.” Id. at § 3(b).
94. Id. at § 1.
95. Id.
96. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 32 (1989) (“[M]any contingent fees are invalid as a matter of ethics,
policy, and law since they are often used in situations where there is either no contingency or . . . the
contingent fee far exceeds any legitimate risk premium for the anticipated effort.”).
97. Nontraditional Audit Programs, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS STATE SERIES
§ 1730.12, A.3 (defining “contract audit”) [hereinafter Nontraditional Audit Programs]; see also id. at
E. (discussing contingent fee arrangements).
98. Murphy v. Swanson, 198 N.W. 116, 120 (N.D. 1924).
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subject to the same ethical constraints against conflicts of interest as are
lawyers. Further, when an outside auditor is compensated on a contingency
fee basis, a negative incentive exists to identify assessment errors that
overvalue taxable property, because reducing those assessed values would
result in a refund to the taxpayer and a concomitant reduction in the auditor’s contingency fee. 99 The practice of outsourcing tax assessment functions with the fee contingent on the amounts recovered thus raises both
conflict of interest and due process concerns. 100 On the other hand, advocates of outsourcing argue that private contract auditors have improved the
overall fairness of the property tax by strengthening enforcement, and that
existing safeguards are sufficient to prevent abuse.101
Contingency fee arrangements with private auditors raise other concerns unique to property tax administration. To compensate for revenue lost
when taxable property escapes identification by the local assessors, a marginally higher tax rate must apply to all other taxable property in a given
jurisdiction in order to finance the local budget. Local government finance
is uniquely a zero-sum game. 102 When taxable property escapes taxation or
is undervalued for assessment purposes, the underpayment imposes an
economic burden on local government and indirectly on all other property
owners, who effectively subsidize local government services provided to
owners of undervalued or escaped property. Furthermore, contingency fee
agreements for outsourced tax audit services avoid accountability through
the local budget process because the true costs of identifying undervalued
property are “hidden” in the form of an offset to property tax revenue. 103

99. Nontraditional Audit Programs, supra note 97, at E. (discussing conflicts of interest associated with contingent fee arrangements).
100. See PARRILLO, supra note 55, at 203 (referring to “the deep objection to tax ferrets – indeed to
the very notion that [tax] enforcers should have a monetary self-interest in the act of enforcement”). The
Institute of Property Tax Professionals has taken the position that engaging private auditors under
contingency fee agreements with local governments violates property owners’ due process rights. See
Institute of Property Taxation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Philip Morris, Inc. v. Cabarrus
Cnty., (No. 93-1710), 1994 WL 16101056, at *4. But see, e.g., Priceline.com Inc. v. City of Anaheim,
103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 536 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010) (rejecting due process challenge to city’s contingent fee contract retaining outside legal counsel to recover several million dollars in unremitted hotel
occupancy taxes from online travel reservation sites).
101. Nontraditional Audit Programs, supra note 97, at E.
102. See Rohlf, supra note 43, at 873 (“[P]roperty tax is a zero-sum system. When a taxpayer
receives a downward adjustment in the value of her property, the system simply spreads the burden
relieved among other taxable properties.”).
103. While contingency fees paid to private auditors are calculated as a percentage of the additional taxes recovered and therefore appear to be at “no cost” to local government, in fact they represent tax
expenditures in the same manner as tax exemptions and credits.

306

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

B. Judicial Constraints
States have addressed the issue of outsourcing property tax audits in a
variety of ways. 104 In a few states, the courts have barred the agreements,
narrowly interpreting statutory authority granted to municipalities by holding that only those powers expressly conferred by statute may be exercised
by local officials. 105 In others, the courts have broadly interpreted general
statutory taxing authority granted to local assessors to include the implied
authority to retain outside private entities to assist in the auditing function. 106 This is particularly so in states that have granted home rule authority to municipalities, which generally confers all powers reasonably
necessary to carry out the operation of local government unless specifically
contrary to uniformly applicable state law. 107
A few courts have held that contingency fee contracts with outside auditors are void and unenforceable on public policy grounds. 108 Those
courts have reasoned that an agreement by which a tax ferret “contingently
shares in a percentage of the tax collected [inherently] offends public policy.” 109 Some courts have suggested that testimony offered by contingent
fee auditors and appraisers is entitled to very little credibility in a tax valuation dispute because of the inherent bias associated with the terms on which

104. See generally 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 51, at § 44.102.
105. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Town of Magnolia, 184 So. 59, 59-60 (Miss. 1938) (barring 50% contingency fee contract for discovering escaped real property); cf. Coonrod v. Marsh, 830 N.E.2d 91, 94-95
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (absent specific statutory authorization and approval by appropriate county officials, county auditor lacked authority to contract with private accountant for 33% contingency fee to
recover more than eight million dollars in local tax funds held by State Treasurer).
106. E.g., Union Pac. Res. Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 381 (Wyo. 1992) (no statutory or constitutional limitation precluding use of contractors; contingency fees, if reasonable and realistic, do not
violate public policy).
107. E.g., Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfr’s. Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ind. 2003); Whitney v.
City of Terrell, 278 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
108. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons, 401 S.E.2d 4, 5 (Ga. 1991) (while Georgia statute
expressly permits local board of tax assessors to contract for identification of escaped personal property,
no statute expressly authorizes contingency fee agreements). But see Simpson v. Silver Bow Cnty., 285
P. 195, 198 (Mont. 1930) (contingent fee contract not against public policy); In re Appeal of Philip
Morris, 436 S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. 1993) (contingency fee contract with outside firm to provide expertise to assessor not contrary to public policy; issue was for legislature), cert. denied sub nom. Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Cabarrus Cnty., 512 U.S. 1228 (1994).
109. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 401 S.E.2d at 5. The court stopped short of declaring the contract
unconstitutional, instead inviting the Legislature to consider the public policy issue if it disagreed with
the court. Id.; see also Yankee Gas Co. v. City of Meriden, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 285, 2001 WL 477424, at
*21 (Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2001). The court in Yankee Gas reasoned,
When an auditor is hired based on a contingent fee basis, there is an inherent and initially unfounded assumption that the original assessment was wrong, and it creates an incentive to determine its inaccuracy and to increase the assessment. Contingent fee arrangements may very
well lead to unfair results, as in the instant case.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
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they have been retained and compensated.110 Scholars and taxpayers have
challenged contingency fee agreements between local governments and tax
ferrets as a constitutional violation of due process. 111 To date, however,
these arguments have been generally unsuccessful. 112
Finally, courts have not missed the irony when property owners challenge the legitimacy of a tax audit: “There is a syllogism that defies realism
that comes affixed to this subject. It provides a conclusion without the recitation of the initial premise . . . why a taxpayer should object to a cross
check of public records if accurate reporting and proper tax payments have
occurred.” 113
C. Statutory Limitations
State statutes address the issue in various ways. Some specifically authorize local taxing jurisdictions to retain outside private parties to assist in

110. E.g., Hubbell, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 85, 1996 WL 66270, at *4 & n.8
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (“[Contract auditor’s] methodology is so indefensible and its interest in distorting data so evident that the evidence and testimony it presented is not worthy of belief.”).
111. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 401 S.E.2d at 5; Tippecanoe Cnty., 784 N.E.2d at 468 (35%
contingency fee agreement with personal property tax ferret); Coalson & Houghton, supra note 49, at
220-21; Janata, supra note 7, at 106 (encouraging state and federal due process challenges); cf. Priceline.com Inc. v. City of Anaheim, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 536 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010) (rejecting due
process argument challenging use of contingency fee legal counsel to assist city attorney in tax assessment proceedings); Hubbell, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 85, 1996 WL 66270, at *4 & n.8 (dicta). In a footnote,
the Hubbell court raised the due process issue, suggesting that contingency fee arrangements between
assessors and outside auditors may implicate due process absent “independent review by an official
who is untainted by such terms for compensation.” Id. (citing, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 528
(1927)). In rejecting a public policy challenge, a Pennsylvania court observed, “[a]s local governments
increasingly turn to private tax collectors and auditors with the legislature’s approval, [the court] must
assume that the legislature knows how such arrangements are structured and does not foresee that
private collectors and auditors will turn into tax bounty hunters threatening the public’s right to fair and
impartial tax assessment.” Suburban Cable TV Co. v. City of Chester, 685 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1996). For an excellent analysis and discussion of the due process issue, see Nancy S. Rendleman &
Charles B. Neely Jr., Can Contingent-Fee Property Tax Audits Be Challenged on Due Process
Grounds?, 4 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 80 (May/June 1994).
112. See, e.g., Tippecanoe Cnty., 784 N.E.2d at 468 (nature of tax ferret’s role not sufficiently
judicial to render commission agreement impermissible); Philip Morris, 436 S.E.2d at 831 (rejecting
due process argument); Rendleman & Neely, supra note 111, at 80; see also Hubbell, 16 Conn. L. Rptr.
85, 1996 WL 66270 at *4 (“We neither reject nor endorse the trial court’s dicta regarding the public
policy implications of such a contract and the procedures by which such a contract may be challenged.”).
113. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 373 (Wyo. 1992); see also id. at 381 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
An earnest argument is made addressing the unseemliness or probable impropriety of expending public funds for reimbursement of the “bounty hunters” on a contingent fee basis. The
irony I perceive is that this argument is made on behalf of those who have it within their control to prevent any such payments. All that is required to avoid any contingent fee payments is
correct and consistent reporting of [taxable property]. If that goal is achieved, there will be no
recoveries out of which to pay such contingent fees.
Id.
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the assessment function, without limiting the method of compensation.114
Others grant contracting authority, subject to certain restrictions. In Connecticut, for example, a statute authorizes local assessors to contract for
valuation services, but the State Office of Policy and Management must
certify private companies retained for that purpose.115 In several states,
statutes that expressly allow local taxing jurisdictions to contract with private entities for assistance in assessing property preclude or limit compensation in the form of contingency fees as a percentage of taxes
recovered. 116
However, authorizing statutes do not always control when a contingency fee arrangement is challenged in court. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Parsons, 117 even though a statute expressly authorized contracts with outside entities for assistance in identifying and reporting escaped or underassessed property, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to enforce a contingency fee contract with a private auditor.118 The court reasoned that the
agreement was void as against public policy in the absence of more explicit
authorizing legislation. 119
In some states, statutes generally authorizing local governments to appoint outside auditors have subsequently been amended to preclude fees as
114. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.024 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 441.50 (West Supp.
2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-425 (2007); see Walker v. Trump, 549 So. 2d 1098, 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Dillon Stores v. Lovelady, 855 P.2d 487, 491 (Kan. 1993) (“tax ferret” metaphor inapplicable when accounting firm assists with record interpretation, as authorized by statute).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2c (West 2008). The statute was enacted following a report of
the governor’s commission on tax reform in 1972, which recommended certification as a means for
ensuring the competence of companies retained to conduct general revaluations. Chamber of Comm. of
Greater Waterbury, Inc. v. Lanese, 439 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Conn. 1981).
116. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-36-12(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); Appeal of Trippet, 101 P.2d
1058, 1060 (Okla. 1940) (affirming contract based on OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 481, providing for contingency fee not to exceed 15% of taxes recovered); see White v. McGill, 114 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex.
1938) (voiding tax ferret contract for assessment and collection of personal property taxes as lacking
statutory authority and approval by Comptroller and Attorney General (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 7335a (repealed 1982), which limited contingent compensation to 15%)).
117. 401 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1991).
118. Id. at 4-5, 5 n.2. “In the exercise of [the] power [to tax], the government by necessity acts
through its agents. However, this necessity does not require nor authorize the creation of a contractual
relationship by which the agent contingently shares in a percentage of the tax collected, and we hold
that such an agreement offends public policy . . . . Fairness and impartiality are threatened where a
private organization has a financial stake in the amount of tax collected as a result of the assessment it
recommends.” Id. at 5 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a)). The court acknowledged freedom of contract as a “competing policy,” but rejected it as a secondary consideration. Id. at 5 n.2. For a comprehensive discussion of public policy considerations counterbalancing traditional freedom of contract
principles, see Mark Petitt, Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the ‘Rise and Fall’, 79 B.U. L. REV.
263, 354 (1999) (“If there is a direct conflict between freedom of contract and some other clearly
articulated value, . . . freedom of contract often loses.”). But see Shinn v. Cunningham, 94 N.W. 941,
942 (Iowa 1903) (“The valid contract of a municipal corporation is just as sacred from legislative
interference or destruction as is one made between individual citizens.”)
119. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 401 S.E.2d at 4-5, 5 n.2.
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a fixed percentage of tax collections. 120 In Indiana, for example, a former
statute expressly authorized boards of county commissioners to contract
with private parties for discovery of taxable property omitted from the tax
rolls, 121 which the Indiana courts had interpreted to include the implied
authority to audit for undervalued property as well. 122 The 2002 Indiana
Legislature amended the statute to expressly authorize contract audits for
undervalued property, but to specifically prohibit contingency fees.123 Utah
amended its authorizing statute in 1994 to preclude counties from paying
compensation to private appraisers on a contingency fee basis.124 In other
states, statutes expressly authorizing local taxing jurisdictions to contract
with outside auditors have been interpreted by state attorneys general to
preclude contingency fee agreements. 125 A few states have recently enacted
statutes precluding local governments from paying outside tax auditors a
contingency fee based upon a percentage of collections. 126
D. Administrative Concerns
Some statutes, courts, and commentators have distinguished contracts
for collection of delinquent property taxes as permissible, while contract
services that support the assessment function are not. 127 The rationale is
that once the underlying tax liability has been established, contracts for
collection of delinquent taxes do not implicate the judgment inherent in the
assessment function itself. 128 Unlike collection of delinquent taxes, the
120. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-36-12(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-299 (West Supp. 2012);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 262 (West 2001); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.01(b) (West 2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-2-703(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2011); see Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. JC-0290 (Oct. 10, 2000)
(Texas statute reflects legislative intent to “closely regulate contingent fee contracts involving taxing
units”).
121. See Ind. Pub. L. No. 178-2002 § 39.
122. See Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfr’s Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463, 466-67 (Ind. 2003) (rejecting
taxpayers’ argument interpreting former statute narrowly to permit contract audits only for omitted
property but not undervalued property; enforcing contract for 35% contingency fee).
123. Id. at 466 n.5 (citing Ind. Pub. L. No. 178-2002 §§ 37-39 (current version codified at IND.
CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-36-12(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)).
124. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-703(2)(c).
125. E.g., Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2009-074 (June 10, 2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0290
(2008) (interpreting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.01). But see Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-8 (Jan. 27,
1994) (tax ferret contracts not void as against public policy, even if contingency fees are not capped).
126. E.g., ALA. CODE § 40-2A-6(a) (LexisNexis 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 136.076(1) (West
2009); TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 25.01 (West 2008); Tippecanoe Cnty., 784 N.E.2d at 466 n.5 (citing
Ind. Pub. L. No. 178-2002 §§ 37-39); see Coalson & Houghton, supra note 49, at 221.
127. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-2A-6 (contingency fee agreements for local assessment services
void and unenforceable, without prohibiting or restricting contracts for collection of delinquent tax); see
also Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2009-074 (June 10, 2009) (narrowly interpreting § 40-2A-6 so as not to
authorize contracts to collect delinquent property taxes for a contingency fee).
128. Bruce Stavitsky, Georgia and North Carolina—Are Contingency Fee Agreements Against
Public Policy?, 1 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 181, 182 (Sept./Oct. 1991) (observing that a
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assessment and classification of taxable property involve a high degree of
expertise, and assessment in particular is considered a quasi-judicial function. 129
Among other arguments, critics have challenged “tax ferret” contracts,
which compensate outside parties based on the percentage of taxes recovered, because these contracts effectively permit the local assessor to supplement the local budget for assessment and collection of property taxes.130
Contingency fees based on a percentage of the increased tax collections
allow the local taxing officials to provide for enhanced audit functions not
otherwise possible with the existing staff of the assessor’s office. Moreover, the contingency fee provides an incentive to the contractor to select
large businesses for audit, whose taxable property is most likely to be under-assessed by substantial amounts. 131
On occasion, taxpayers have challenged the reasonableness of the percentage contingency fee paid to contract auditors. For example, one court
upheld a fifty percent contingency fee over an argument that the fee was
presumptively excessive. 132 The court was unable to conclude as a matter
of law that the contract terms were unreasonable or unjust and ultimately
enforced the contract, deferring to the judgment of local elected officials. 133 In most cases, as long as the compensation does not exceed statutory restrictions and the appropriate officials authorize the agreement, the
courts have held the contracts enforceable.
E. Constitutional Considerations
Contingency fee agreements with outside auditors raise understandable suspicions among property owners regarding objectivity and fairness. If
the outside auditor lacks appropriate oversight by local officials, these
agreements amount to delegation of broad powers to private agents who

private agent may be paid a contingency fee only if the county surrenders tax collection as opposed to
tax assessment (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 2:77-377.01; N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-22-29)).
129. Scholars who have raised due process concerns about outsourcing local property tax audits for
a contingency fee emphasize the quasi-judicial nature of the assessment function. See Rendleman &
Neely, supra note 111, at 82 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Hagan v. Reclamation Dist.
No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884)).
130. Cf. Axelrad & Perrochet, supra note 78, at 337 & n.23 (advancing analogous argument with
respect to contingent fee counsel (citing David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a
Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 320
n.3 (2001)).
131. E.g., In re Philip Morris, 424 S.E.2d at 223.
132. E.g., Shinn v. Cunningham, 94 N.W. 941, 941-42 (Iowa 1903).
133. Id. at 942.
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lack political accountability. 134 In addition, property owners have observed
that contingency fee agreements effectively divert to private entities funds
that would otherwise accrue to local government. 135 At the very least, contingency fee agreements between local tax assessors and private auditors,
even when entered into in good faith, have the appearance of impropriety.
For that reason alone, they undermine taxpayer confidence and are contrary
to public policy.
Under some circumstances, compensating property tax auditors based
on a percentage of the taxes recovered may violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a very early decision, a federal circuit
judge reached that conclusion in addressing a due process challenge to the
Ohio property tax assessment scheme, under which an auditor was paid a
percentage of the tax recovery from escaped property. 136
In Meyer v. Shields, 137 the auditor received four percent of the taxes
recovered upon identifying omitted property. Inquisitors, who received
twenty percent of the tax recovery, provided evidence in the assessment
process. 138 The court held that the direct pecuniary interest of the tax auditor in the outcome of the assessment process disqualified him from making
a valid assessment, reasoning vociferously (in the flowery prose characteristic of the times) that the procedure violated the Due Process Clause:
[I]n the eager and hot pursuit of the citizen who wrongfully evades his
just taxes we must be careful not to graft upon the body of our judicial
system proceedings so arbitrary and summary that they may hereafter be
the basis and precedent for laws dangerous in the highest degree to the
personal liberty and property rights of every citizen. . . . [T]he auditor’s
compensation is directly dependent upon the finding he makes. If he
finds against the taxpayer, he is sure of his reward, and it is secured by
the highest lien, and most summary process for its collection. Not only is
he interested in finding against the taxpayer, but his fee grows with the
increasing amount of his assessment. . . . The fee is evidently not intended to be given in the nature of compensation for services alone. It is
therefore not only in the nature of a bribe to decide against the citizen,
but a corrupting inducement to make his finding the largest possible. As

134. See Stavitsky, supra note 128, at 181-82 (suggesting that taxing authorities in jurisdictions
that allow retroactive audits “have abdicated their auditing responsibilities to tax consultants, which, for
a contingency fee, audit a business taxpayer’s personal property tax returns”).
135. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 378 (Wyo. 1992).
136. Meyer v. Shields, 61 F. 713, 725-27 (N.D. Ohio 1894).
137. Id.; see also Brinkerhoff v. Brumfield, 94 F. 422, 426 (N.D. Ohio 1899) (describing broad
authority Ohio law conferred to auditors compensated on contingency fee; adopting reasoning in Meyers).
138. Meyer, 61 F. at 727.
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the proceedings are arbitrary . . . the temptation to a large assessment is
so great that it would be wrong to submit the ordinary mortal to it.139

The United States Supreme Court discussed the constitutional issue in
another context in Tumey v. Ohio, 140 occasionally cited in support of the
argument that due process guarantees preclude compensating local property
tax auditors based on a percentage of taxes recovered. 141 However, the
facts and reasoning in Tumey offer little direct support for the argument. In
that case, the Court reversed a conviction under the Ohio Prohibition Act as
a violation of due process. 142 State law provided that a city mayor could
preside at the criminal trial, and upon conviction receive as compensation
(in addition to the mayor’s salary) any costs assessed against the accused. 143 The Court held in part that the mayor’s pecuniary interest in the
outcome denied the accused due process of law. 144 Moreover, the Court
expressed concern that the mayor had exercised inherently conflicting duties as the city’s chief executive and as judge in a criminal proceeding with
the power to assess monetary penalties that accrued to the city. 145 Nevertheless, dicta in Tumey raised a federal due process issue, as yet unresolved,
with respect to outsourcing property tax assessment functions in consideration for a percentage of the taxes recovered. 146
More recently, In re Philip Morris USA, 147 a tax appeal from the
North Carolina Property Tax Commission, addressed the due process issue.
Cabarrus County contracted with Tax Management Associates, Inc. (TMA)
for audit services involving a selected sample of county businesses. The fee
arrangement provided for Cabarrus County to pay TMA thirty-five percent
of the taxes and penalties yielded from TMA’s efforts to identify escaped
or undervalued property. 148 At the behest of TMA, the county assessor
ultimately assessed back taxes on escaped personal property at Philip Morris’s cigarette manufacturing plant, the largest taxpayer in the county, in the
139. Id. at 725-27. Just a year earlier, the Ohio Supreme Court had concluded that the statutes did
not violate the state constitution, reasoning that the auditor’s assessment decision was subject to judicial
review. See Probasco v. Raine, 34 N.E. 536, 539 (Ohio 1893) (dicta).
140. 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927).
141. E.g., Hubbell, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 85, 1996 WL 66270, at *4 & n.8
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996); Rendleman & Neely, supra note 111, at 82.
142. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 514-15.
143. Id. at 520.
144. “The [mayor’s] court is a state agency, imposing substantial punishment . . . . It is not to be
treated as a mere village tribunal for village peccadilloes.” Id. at 532.
145. Id. at 533-34.
146. Id. at 532. In dicta, the Court merely observed that Meyer had reached the “exact opposite
conclusion” from Probasco v. Raine, 34 N.E. 536 (Ohio 1894). Tumey, 273 U.S. at 528.
147. 436 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. 1993).
148. In re Philip Morris U.S.A., 424 S.E.2d 222, 223 (N.C. App. 1993), rev’d, 436 S.E.2d 828
(N.C. 1993).
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total amount of nearly $1 billion. On appeal, the county board of equalization reduced the assessed value to $599,426,934.
On review of the county board’s final determination before the North
Carolina Property Tax Commission, Philip Morris moved to strike the original assessment as null and void, contending that the county’s contingency
fee contract with TMA was not only void as against public policy but also
unconstitutional. In a 3-2 decision, the Commission concluded that the
contract was contrary to public policy, observing that it lacked jurisdiction
to decide the constitutional issue. 149 But the Commission reasoned that the
contingent fee arrangement “so offended conventional standards requiring
fair, impartial, and uniform treatment of this State’s taxpayers that [the
contract] could not stand.” 150
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. 151 The
court agreed that the contract was contrary to public policy, expressing
particular concern that the contract permitted TMA, rather than the county
assessor, to select businesses for audit. 152 The contingency fee nature of the
agreement, which gave TMA a financial stake in the outcome of the audit,
gave the appearance of bias and potential abuse, and therefore was contrary
to public policy. 153 The Court of Appeals summarily rejected the alternative due process and equal protection arguments asserted by Philip Morris. 154
The County then appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
which reversed. 155 The court rejected the argument that the contingency fee
agreement with TMA was contrary to public policy, observing that the
legislature had authorized counties to contract with outside auditors to assist county assessors, without limiting the nature of the compensation to be
paid. Incidental to that express power, the court reasoned that the county
also had authority to determine the terms for compensating private audi149. Id. at 224. In most states, property tax tribunals lack authority to decide constitutional issues,
even though they are effectively courts of record for purposes of judicial review. To preserve the constitutional issue for judicial consideration, an aggrieved property owner must nevertheless raise the issue,
with supporting evidence in the record, as early as possible in the administrative proceeding. See Janata,
supra note 7, at 106; cf. Ward v. State, 538 S.E.2d 245, 247 (S.C. 2000) (agencies cannot rule on constitutional validity of statutes, but can decide whether a party’s constitutional rights have been violated).
150. Philip Morris, 424 S.E.2d at 224 (quoting Final Decision of the Property Tax Commission,
May 24, 1991).
151. Id. at 226.
152. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co.). “We believe the present facts to be [even] more egregious
to the notion of fair and impartial taxation than in Sears, because . . . here TMA is given the discretion
to choose its sample of taxpayers.” Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. In re Philip Morris U.S.A., 436 S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Cabarrus Cnty., 512 U.S. 1228 (1994).
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tors. 156 While the Legislature had expressly barred contingency fee contracts in other specific circumstances, it had not elected to so restrict contracts for tax assessment services. Deferring to the Legislature, the court
concluded that the county’s contingent fee contracts were not contrary to
public policy. 157
Philip Morris sought certiorari on the constitutional question: specifically, “[w]hether the use of private ‘bounty hunters’ by a county government to conduct property tax audits under a pure contingent fee
arrangement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 158 After accepting several amicus briefs, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, leaving the due process issue unresolved. 159
Thus, it remains an open question whether retaining property tax auditors on a contingency fee basis violates the due process rights of property
owners, under either the Fourteenth Amendment or the counterpart provisions of state constitutions. Relevant considerations include whether the
arrangement with private auditors includes sufficient safeguards and oversight by public officials. 160 For example, constitutional concerns are substantially mitigated when contract auditors limit their role to reviewing
public records to identify discrepancies, without auditing taxpayers’ private
records, unilaterally increasing or recommending increases in the assessed
valuation, or serving in a quasi-judicial capacity. 161 If the appointment of
auditors is approved by local elected officials, and especially if the local
assessor exercises independent judgment in selecting audit targets and retains authority to make all significant assessment decisions requiring judgment, contracts with outside auditors will most likely withstand
constitutional, statutory, and public policy scrutiny. 162 But whether a con156. Id. at 830-31.
157. Id. at 831 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-299).
158. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris, 436 S.E.2d 828 (No. 931710), 1994 WL
16099642, at *i.
159. Philip Morris Inc. v. Cabarrus Cnty., 512 U.S. 1228 (1994). Ironically, the North Carolina
Legislature recently amended the challenged statute. Effective July 1, 2012, counties may no longer
appoint any outside firm to assist in the assessment function who are “compensated, in whole or in part,
on a contingent fee basis or any other similar method that may impair the assessor’s independence or
the perception of the assessor’s independence by the public.” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-299 (West
Supp. 2012); 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 152.
160. See Coalson & Houghton, supra note 49, at 223-24 (suggesting factors influencing state court
consideration of public policy and due process issues).
161. E.g., Union Pac. Res. Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 377 (Wyo. 1992) (“In no sense did the
activity of the counties’ contract representatives actually consist of an audit.”); see Dillon Stores v.
Lovelady, 855 P.2d 487, 491 (Kan. 1993) (statute limited contractor’s services to record review).
162. See Scott M. Edwards, Indiana High Court Approves Use of Outside, Contingent-Fee Auditors, 13 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 34, 34 (Sept. 2003) (discussing Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind.
Mfr’s Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2003)).
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tingency fee arrangement dictates a contract auditor’s compensation is
certainly a relevant factor to consider. 163
Setting aside the constitutional issues, contract assessors who have a
pecuniary interest in the outcome raise legitimate policy concerns, which
local governments could ameliorate by compensating them on a fee-forservice or hourly arrangement rather than a contingency fee. 164 State certification or registration, requiring minimum education and training for contract auditors and assessors, would help ensure government oversight and
discourage unethical conduct.
III. ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO TAX CONSULTANTS, TAX
DETECTIVES, AND TAX AGENTS RETAINED ON A CONTINGENCY FEE BASIS
In 2009, the Texas Attorney General filed a complaint against
O’Connor and Associates, a large Houston tax consulting firm, 165 for violating Texas consumer protection statutes. 166 Specifically, the State alleged
that O’Connor’s firm “engaged in unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.” 167 O’Connor
represents property owners who challenge their assessed valuations before
state and local assessment officials, and the firm typically charges a contingency fee of fifty percent of the tax savings. 168
According to the Complaint, many consumers had notified local appraisal districts and the Better Business Bureau about ethical misconduct

163. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 504 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(distinguishing Sears Roebuck and Philip Morris; “Unlike those cases, the present case does not involve
a contingent fee arrangement, nor is [the contract auditor] afforded the discretion to choose the target of
the audit.”).
164. Janata, supra note 7, at 106.
165. The firm claims to be the “largest independent real estate research and support services firm
in the Southwest, conducting business nationwide,” with over 200 employees. See About Us: History,
O’CONNOR & ASSOCIATES, http://www.poconnor.com/au_history.asp.
166. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and for Temporary and Permanent Injunction, Texas v. Patrick O’Connor & Assoc. (No. 2009-33833), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2009/052909oconnor_pop.pdf [hereinafter cited as
O’Connor Complaint].
167. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.50 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). The Act
provides for civil penalties of up to $20,000 for any practice calculated to deprive a consumer of money
or property from a consumer in violation of the Act. If the consumer is 65 or older, civil penalties
increase to $250,000 per violation. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) (West 2011).
168. O’Connor Complaint ¶ 9.28; see Commercial Service Agreement, O’CONNOR & ASSOCIATES,
http://www.poconnor.com/offer_2.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (“Our [30-50% Contingency] Fee
Offer for Commercial Property Owners”); Residential Service Agreement, O’CONNOR & ASSOCIATES,
http://www.poconnor.com/offer_1.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (“Our [50% Contingency] Fee Offer
for Homeowners”). O’Connor’s website also markets federal tax reduction services, market research,
and appraisal services. See O’CONNOR & ASSOCIATES, http://www.poconnor.com/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2013).
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and misrepresentation by the firm. 169 For example, property owners asserted that O’Connor had filed tax protests on their properties without consent
and billed them for fifty percent of the resulting tax savings. When complainants refused to pay, O’Connor filed suit. 170 Even when property owners specifically notified the firm that they did not want its services, the firm
would nevertheless pursue tax appeals on their behalf, sometimes falsifying
the required Appointment of Agent forms and supporting jurats. 171 As a
result, the appraisal district sent notices pertaining to the appeal to
O’Connor’s firm, not to the property owner. 172
In addition, the Complaint alleged that the firm had routinely failed to
appear at scheduled tax protest hearings before the Appraisal Review
Board. Records of the Harris County Appraisal District allegedly showed
that after filing protests, “O’Connor failed to appear or present any evidence at the hearing in approximately 9,000 cases.” 173 As a result, those
property owners unknowingly and involuntarily waived or compromised
their right to further appeal. 174
The Complaint also alleged a number of deceptive advertising practices based on representations on the firm’s website. 175 In addition, O’Connor
allegedly claimed “blanket” authority to compromise and settle lawsuits on
behalf of property owners without their input or consent. Based on these
allegations, the State claimed numerous violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. 176 The Attorney General sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as monetary penalties and attorney’s
fees. 177
On November 11, 2010, the case settled, with the O’Connor firm
agreeing to a comprehensive injunction and payment of $800,000 in restitution and attorney fees, but without admitting liability. 178 The settlement
agreement included assurances that the firm would properly notify clients
for whom the company intended to file tax protests, abide by client notices
169. O’Connor Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶ 9.14.
170. Id. at ¶ 9.15.
171. Id. at ¶ 9.18. Texas law requires an unsworn declaration to include a jurat or verification
signed under penalty of perjury by the declarant. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001(c)
(West Supp. 2013).
172. Id. at ¶ 9.19.
173. Id. at ¶ 9.25.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶¶ 9.26-9.28.
176. Id. ¶ 10.1; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (West 2011).
177. O’Connor Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶¶ 13.1, 13.4.
178. Agreed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, at 17, 18, Tex v. Patrick O’Connor &
Assoc. (Nov. 11, 2010), (No. 2009-33833), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/notice/
Signed_AFJPI.pdf.
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of intent to terminate representation, attend formal hearings on behalf of
clients as authorized, refrain from negotiating settlements involving properties owned by multiple clients without notifying each one, comply with
telemarketing laws, and refrain from false or misleading advertising. 179
The settlement included payment of $550,000 in restitution to Texas consumers and $250,000 to reimburse the state for attorney fees and costs. 180
The Harris County District Court has retained jurisdiction to oversee compliance with the injunction. 181
The alleged misconduct of the O’Connor firm is all the more surprising because Texas is one of the few states that regulate individuals and
firms who appear on behalf of clients in property tax valuation and protest
proceedings. 182 While perhaps the first time a tax consulting firm has been
prosecuted for consumer protection violations, the O’Connor litigation is
by no means the first instance of alleged unethical and illegal practices by
property tax consultants. 183 Scandals involving bribery and kickbacks between tax consultants and tax assessors have been reported all over the
country, some quite recently.
In 1965, San Francisco newspapers reported a major scandal involving
kickbacks paid to a long-time San Francisco City Assessor by James
Tooke, a property tax consultant. The scandal broke when Tooke’s employee, Norman Phillips, removed five locked file cabinets in the dark of
night from his employer’s office and delivered them to a reporter for the
San Francisco Chronicle. 184 The file cabinets were full of cancelled
checks, correspondence, and detailed records documenting a widespread
system of bribery and kickbacks that led to the indictment of more than
twenty individuals, including the San Francisco City Assessor and thirteen
county assessors. 185

179. Id. at 4-11, 13, 14.
180. Id. at 17.
181. Id. at 16.
182. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. chs. 1151-52 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (regulating property tax
professionals and property tax consultants).
183. See Clark, supra note 63, at 18, 28-31 (describing a variety of “questionable and unethical
practices that may be employed by unscrupulous consulting firms”).
184. PAUL, supra note 20, at 94; see James Phelan, When I Looked in Those Files, My Eyes
Popped, 239 THE SATURDAY EVENING POST 23, 23 (Sept. 10, 1966) (reporting sophisticated and
widespread bribery scandal among California local assessors and property tax consultant James Tooke,
leading to multiple indictments). When asked what triggered his suspicion, Mr. Phillips responded that
over a period of several days at a convention of tax assessors, Tooke had been visited by a number of
local assessors who were handed plain, sealed, white envelopes that they had tucked away, unopened.
Id. at 24.
185. Phelan, supra note 184, at 25.
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Following an in-depth investigation that extended to other states, the
top deputy to the California Attorney General reported, “This is only the
California tail on a very large national dog. The difference between California and other states is that we found out what has been going on.” 186
Whistleblower Norman Phillips remarked, “There are men like Jim Tooke
all over the country, operating the same way. They are well known in tax
consultant circles and to people in many assessor offices in other states.” 187
New York City has had its share of property tax scandals. In 2002,
shortly after New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office, an
investigation revealed widespread corruption involving tax assessors, tax
consultants, and possibly even some prominent tax lawyers. 188 Bloomberg
referred to the scheme as “the largest and most financially damaging corruption scheme ever conducted within city government,” a most remarkable indictment from the mayor of New York City with its well-known
Tammany Hall history. 189 By late 2002, fifteen assessors had pleaded
guilty. 190 The alleged mastermind of the scheme was former city tax assessor Albert Schussler, who pleaded not guilty and was scheduled to go to
trial early in 2003. 191 During his thirty-five-year career as a tax consultant
after retiring from his career in city government, Schussler was accused of
bribing city assessors in exchange for reducing tax assessments for large
commercial property owners in Manhattan. 192 One assessor, who had
worked for city government for more than forty-five years before his 1996
retirement, pleaded guilty to having accepting $4.1 million in bribes from
Schussler from 1991 to 1997. 193

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Charles V. Bagli, Scandal Over Property Tax Bribes May Extend to Lawyers and Firms, NY
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/07/nyregion/scandal-over-property-tax-bribesmay-extend-to-lawyers-and-firms.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Schussler never went to trial; he died of a massive stroke on January 6, 2003. Charles V.
Bagli, Man at Center of Bribe Case Dies of Stroke, NY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/01/08/nyregion/man-at-center-of-bribe-case-dies-of-stroke.html. Schussler had been a city tax
assessor for thirty years before he retired in 1967. Id. According to the indictment, he had established
his tax consulting business immediately after retiring, initiating the bribery scheme with a friend still
working in the assessor’s office. Id. By 2004, 17 of Schussler’s codefendants had pleaded guilty, and
the City of New York recovered $17.5 million from Schussler’s estate. CITY OF NEW YORK DEP’T OF
INVESTIGATION, DOI Recovers $17.5 Million for New York City, NYC.GOV (Oct. 22, 2004, Release #
62-2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/downloads/pdf/pr62schussler_check_102204.pdf.
192. Bagli, supra note 188.
193. Charles V. Bagli & William K. Rashbaum, Grand Jury Examines Allegations Tax Assessors
Took Bribes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/14/nyregion/grand-juryexamines-allegations-tax-assessors-took-bribes.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
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Returning to California, an investigation is underway involving an alleged scandal in the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office.194 The elected
county assessor, together with a tax consultant who was a major campaign
contributor, have been accused of lowering property tax assessments in
exchange for campaign contributions. 195 When the investigation widened
with new charges filed in April 2013, a deputy district attorney told reporters, “This has turned out to be a very deep iceberg.” 196 More charges may
be forthcoming. 197
One might wonder how the financial stakes in the business of property
tax consulting could be so great as to support alleged instances of widespread bribery and kickbacks paid by tax consultants to local assessors. The
answer is that property tax consultants generally receive compensation
based on a substantial percentage of the estimated tax savings generated on
behalf of their clients. 198 And property tax assessment is a recurring phenomenon, with property tax valuation notices and tax bills sent out annually. With nearly a half trillion dollars nationwide transferring annually from
property owners to local governments, it should not be surprising that entrepreneurs have devised methods for intervening to offer services to both
taxing jurisdictions and property owners. 199
Variously known as property tax consultants, tax representatives, or
tax agents, those who practice the trade generally receive compensation
based on a fixed percentage of the estimated tax savings attributable to
194. Cris K. O’Neall, Scandal Fallout Threatens Los Angeles Property Tax System, NAT’L REAL
EST. INV. (June 21, 2013), available at http://nreionline.com/legal/scandal-fallout-threatens-los-angelesproperty-tax-system; Jack Dolan & Ruben Vives, An Unlikely Player in L.A. County Assessor Scandal,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/local/la-me-assessor-schenter20121230.
195. O’Neall, supra note 194.
196. Dakota Smith, More Charges Filed in L.A. County Assessor John Noguez Scandal Case, L.A.
DAILY NEWS (April 23, 2013), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130423/more-charges-filedin-la-county-assessor-john-noguez-scandal-case.
197. Id. On October 28, 2013, a dozen new felony charges were filed against Noguez and tax
consultant Ramin Salari. Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, More Corruption Charges
Filed Against Noguez, Salari (Oct. 28, 2013), http://da.co.la.ca.us/mr/pdf/10.28.13%20More%
20Corruption%20Charges%20Filed%20Against%20Noguez,%20Salari.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
“Prosecutors allege that Noguez accepted bribes from Salari to lower property tax assessments for some
of Salari’s clients.” Id.
198. See I. Henry Glickman, Working with a Property Tax Consultant: Guidelines for an Effective
Partnership, 3 (Conway Data, Inc., Oct. 1995), available at http://www.jcsco.com/New%
20Website%20Images/Working%20with%20Property%20Tax%20Consultant%20Paper.pdf. In some
instances, a property owner may negotiate an hourly rate, a flat fee, or an upper limit on the contingency
fee, but these variations are atypical. See id.
199. See Alexander Hazen, Property Tax Ethics Issues Confront Practitioners and the Government, 9 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 22, 26 (July 1999) (“Political clout, cronyism, lavish
entertaining of assessors and clients, the ‘good old boy system’—all are phrases describing conditions
that existed in the field of property taxation for much of its history.”).
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their services. 200 In all but a handful of states, property tax consultants are
not licensed or subject to ethical standards. 201 Property tax consultants
offer a range of services, which generally include reviewing property records in the assessor’s office to ensure accuracy, reviewing the property’s
physical characteristics and condition, analyzing comparable properties,
and reviewing income and expenses for commercial properties. 202 If appropriate, the consultant may evaluate prospects for a successful appeal,
develop an appropriate litigation strategy, present information to the assessor’s office to advocate for a reduced valuation, and attend hearings on the
client’s behalf. 203 In some cases, the consultant may even testify as an expert witness at a public hearing or trial, or the consultant may retain an
expert witness for that purpose.
Some agreements give the property tax consultant exclusive authority
to retain expert witnesses or attorneys as deemed necessary to pursue an
appeal, typically with the consultant bearing the expense. The contract also
may reserve to the consultant the unilateral authority to settle or compromise the claim, or to pursue an appeal. The agreement may provide for a
tiered contingency fee percentage for each level of appeal, specifying a
higher share if judicial review becomes necessary. 204
In some cases, courts have refused to enforce contracts with tax consulting firms providing for a contingency fee. 205 In others, the courts seem
200. Examples of tax consultant contracts are included in Appendix B. According to the National
Association of Property Tax Attorneys, lawyers also perform these services, generally for 30 to 50% of
the tax savings for each year in dispute. Jeannette Neumann & Saabira Chaudhuri, How to Lower Your
Property Taxes, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111904070604576514573303531678.html?KEYWORDS=%22How+to+Lower+Your
+Property+Taxes%22. However, contingency fees may exceed 50% in particularly complex cases. For
example, the Kansas Supreme Court enforced an agreement with a property tax attorney providing for a
contingency fee of 50% of any savings resulting from informal appeals at the local level and 70% of the
savings obtained on appeal to the state board of equalization. See Miller v. Botwin, 899 P.2d 1004,
1006, 1009-10 (Kan. 1995). These percentages appear extraordinary, even for a complex valuation case,
especially because the attorney failed to keep records of the time spent on the case. Id. at 1010.
201. E.g., Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 2002-58 (“[S]ection 194.034(1)(a), Florida Statutes, does not require
that an agent appearing before a value adjustment board be a licensed or qualified professional”); see
Clark, supra note 63, at 29 (“The property tax consulting business is not generally regulated.”); Glickman, supra note 198, at 2 (while tax consultants are generally unlicensed, voluntary membership in
professional organizations that promote training, education, and ethical conduct is one indicator of
professionalism).
202. See Glickman, supra note 198, at 2. Commercial properties, unlike residential property, are
often valued using the income approach, which generates a value by capitalizing the net income annually produced by the property.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 3.
205. E.g., Prop. Valuation Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Supermarkets, Inc., No. 96-2699 at 2,
3, 5 (Wis. App. 1st Dist. Sept. 16, 1997) (refusing to enforce 50% contingency fee after interpreting
contract ambiguity against plaintiff because tax savings resulted not from consultant’s efforts but from
village’s reassessment).
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quite willing to enforce a contingency fee tax consulting contract according
to its terms, at least when the property owner is a sophisticated commercial
enterprise. 206 South Carolina is the only state that has enacted a statute
clearly prohibiting property tax consultants from charging contingency fees
in most instances. 207 In 2011 and 2012, California considered two bills;
one would have prohibited contingency fees, and the other would have
precluded property tax agents from charging unconscionable fees. 208 Neither bill passed.
A. Champerty as a Contract Defense
Contingency fee agreements with property tax consultants have been
challenged as unenforceable on various grounds. One basis for refusing to
enforce the typical tax consultant contract is that it violates traditional doctrines disfavoring barratry, maintenance, and champerty, 209 which common
law prohibited. 210 Maintenance 211 is the practice of stirring up litigation—
specifically, assisting another in prosecuting or defending a legal claim
when the maintainor has no bona fide interest in the matter.212 Barratry, a
more egregious form of maintenance, involves “[v]exatious incitement to
litigation, [especially] by soliciting potential legal clients.” 213 Champerty, a
variation of maintenance, is an agreement by which a third party pursues
litigation on behalf of another and bears the expenses in consideration for a

206. E.g. First Coast Consultants, Inc. v. Flagler Dev. Co., Case No. 16-2010-CA-2853-XXXX,
2011 WL 7859291 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 4th Dist. July 12, 2011) (enforcing plaintiff property tax consulting
firm’s “clear and unambiguous” agreement providing for a 30% contingency fee against “the largest ad
valorem tax payer in Duval County”).
207. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 393 and accompanying text.
209. For a classic case of maintenance involving a local tax dispute, see Lucas v. Allen, 80 Ky.
681 (1883). The clerk of the Louisville Board of Aldermen claimed to have information that would
support taxpayer claims to recover illegally collected city taxes. Lucas gave the information to defendant attorneys and promised to assist in prosecuting claims on behalf of the taxpayers in exchange for
half the attorney fees. The attorneys were successful, recovering $18,439 as their fee. Lucas sued for his
half. The court refused to enforce the contract, in part because “it partakes of maintenance in its worst
form.” Id. at 683. The court also held the contract unenforceable as against public policy. Id. at 682.
210. For an exhaustive account of the ancient underpinnings of the three doctrines, see Max Radin,
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935).
211. At common law, maintenance was an actionable wrong akin to a modern-day tort. Id. at 67.
212. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 965 (7th ed. 1999); see Radin, supra note 210, at 66-67 (“[A]
maintainor is one who stirs up vexatious suits to which he is not a party . . . .”).
213. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (7th ed. 1999); see Radin, supra note 210, at 67 (“[A] barrator is one who makes a profession of [maintenance] . . . .”). In modern parlance, barratry might be
analogized to “ambulance chasing.” An example is In re Lynch’s Estate, 276 N.Y.S. 939 (Surrogate’s
Court, N.Y. Cnty. 1935), in which the movant was engaged in locating foreign beneficiaries of U.S.
estates and promising to secure their inheritances for a contingency fee. The court held the contracts
void ab initio. Id. at 945.
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share of any proceeds. 214 Both champerty and barratry were crimes at
common law, 215 and the public interest warranted their suppression. 216
In the modern era, most states have relaxed or even abolished the
common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance, 217 in part in recognition of the commonly accepted practice of contingency fees as a means
for compensating attorneys under the American Rule. 218 However, several
states continue to recognize barratry as a crime, 219 and many still recognize
champerty, at least as a contract defense.220 For example, a Pennsylvania
court has applied the champerty doctrine in considering the validity of a
school district’s contract with a realtor, who for a forty percent contingency
fee had offered to file tax assessment appeals on properties he had identified as undervalued. 221 In Connecticut, a criminal statute specifically prohibits non-attorneys from soliciting, advising, requesting, or advising
another person to file a cause of action for damages when the amount of

214. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (7th ed. 1999); see Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224,
1225 (Mass. 1997) (defining champerty); Radin, supra note 210, at 67 (“[A] champertor is one who
does so for pecuniary gain . . . .”).
215. England abolished the offenses of maintenance and champerty in 1967, but retained the
doctrines to the extent that a contract to maintain litigation without sufficient justification is unenforceable as contrary to public policy. Y.L. Tan, Champertous Contracts and Assignments, 106 L. Q. REV.
656, 657 & n.7 (1990).
216. E.g., Gregerson v. Imlay, 10 F. Cas. 1185 (S.D. N.Y. 1861) (refusing to enforce contract
“tainted with champerty and maintenance;” defendant had agreed to confer all rights to enforce patent
infringement claims nationwide in exchange for 50% contingency fee, with plaintiff covering litigation
costs and attorney fees); Radin, supra note 210, at 67. Radin makes a persuasive argument that the
common law distaste for champerty and maintenance should not apply to contingency fees paid to
attorneys, assuming appropriate oversight by the courts as required by the ABA Code of Ethics. Id. at
69-75; see also In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. 1984) (“Abuses are best handled by control
and regulation.”).
217. E.g., Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1226-27 (the evils champerty was intended to prevent can be
remedied by rules requiring reasonable attorney fees, public policy against excessive fees, and contract
doctrines of unconscionability, duress, good faith, and standards of fair dealing).
218. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2002). In England
and Europe, contingency fees are generally impermissible, even to compensate lawyers. In re Swartz,
686 P.2d at 1241 (citing Note, Lawyer’s Tight Rope—Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 683,
685–86 (1956)). But the United States Supreme Court has long since held that an agreement to pay an
attorney a contingency fee for “professional services of a legitimate character” is not contrary to public
policy. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556-57 (1876).
219. E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12 (West Supp. 2013). Under Texas statutes, contracts for
legal services procured as result of barratry are voidable at the election of the client. TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 82.065(b) (West Supp. 2013); see id. § 82.0651 (civil liability for barratry).
220. Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1297, 1298 (2002) (arguing that champerty’s critics underestimate its continuing vitality); see also
id. at 1333 (Appendix summarizing each state’s champerty laws).
221. Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d
1262, 1263, 1265-66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
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recovery determines the attorney’s compensation. 222 In addition, Connecticut recognizes both champerty and public policy as common law defenses
to contract enforcement actions. 223 However, champerty is not a defense
when enforcing a right not originating in the illegal agreement, or when
proof of the agreement is not necessary to enforce the right. 224
A classic example of a champertous agreement is Merrell v. Stuart,225
a 1941 case decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The agreement
was analogous to a typical tax-consulting contract that authorizes the consultant to retain an attorney. A non-lawyer negotiated an agreement with an
attorney to split a fifty percent contingency fee in a prospective suit against
an estate on behalf of the decedent’s adult daughter, born out of wedlock,
whom the decedent had acknowledged during his lifetime. 226 The nonlawyer, who was acquainted with the daughter and her family heritage,
induced her to enter into a contingency fee contract prepared by the attorney, in which she agreed to pay half of any recovery from the estate.227
Ultimately she won a compromised judgment of $9,000, which was paid to
the attorney in trust for her. The non-lawyer sued, claiming $2,250 as his
share of the fee. 228
The attorney demurred, arguing that the contract was champertous,
contrary to public policy, and void. 229 The court agreed and refused to
enforce the contract.230 While the state had abolished champerty and
maintenance as common law offenses, 231 the court held the contract unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 232 The court refused to aid the plaintiff in profiting from a void contract. 233
On the other hand, in Wardman v. Leopold, 234 a federal income tax refund case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-86(a) (West 2005). It is doubtful that the statute would apply to
actions seeking a reduction in value for taxable property because a reduced assessment does not necessarily result in a tax refund, unless the disputed taxes have been paid under protest.
223. See Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460, 463 (Conn. 2000).
224. Id. Therefore, the Town could not challenge the property owner’s right to pursue an adjusted
assessment just because his agreement with a non-attorney tax consultant was champertous or contrary
to public policy. Id. The court hinted, however, that the defense might be cognizable if the tax consultant sought to enforce the agreement. See id. at 463-64.
225. 17 S.E.2d 458 (N.C. 1941).
226. Id. at 459.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 459-60.
230. Id. at 460.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 463.
233. Id.
234. 85 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1936).

324

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

affirmed a judgment in favor of a non-lawyer tax specialist and accounting
partnership, rejecting a defense of champerty and maintenance.235 Under
their agreement, the partners were to receive one third of the income taxes
recovered on behalf of the taxpayer, which they in turn had agreed to divide with retained legal counsel who pursued the refund on appeal. 236 The
taxpayer sought to set aside the agreement, arguing that it was a contract of
maintenance and champerty. 237 The court disagreed and affirmed, finding
the agreement enforceable.238 The court distinguished actions before government agencies from actions filed in court, holding that the contract in
question was not champertous because it was not for the purpose of litigation, but rather to recover taxes from the government. 239 The court also
declined to hold that an equitable lien could not be imposed on the tax proceeds just because plaintiffs were not lawyers. “[I]t is immaterial whether it
be for an attorney’s fee . . . or for the fee of an engineer . . . or for the fee of
tax specialists, as in the instant case.” 240
With respect to tax consulting contracts, Pennsylvania courts have
twice invoked the champerty doctrine to preclude a tax-consulting firm
from representing property owners in tax assessment appeals. 241 Under
Pennsylvania law, 242 three elements are generally required to support a
claim or affirmative defense of champerty: first, the party must lack any
legitimate interest in the lawsuit; second, the party must advance its own

235. Id. at 278-80.
236. Id. at 277-78.
237. Id. at 278.
238. Id. at 282.
239. Id. at 279-80.
240. Id. at 281. The Wardman court’s reasoning is highly questionable in light of the proliferation
of administrative tax tribunals at the state and local levels. Courts have generally refused to distinguish
between administrative tribunals and courts of law with respect to issues involving the unauthorized
practice of law. E.g., Shortz v. Farrell, 193 A. 20, 21 (Pa. 1937).
In considering the scope of the practice of law mere nomenclature is unimportant, as, for example, whether or not the tribunal is called a ‘court,’ or the controversy ‘litigation.’ Where the
application of legal knowledge and technique is required, the activity constitutes such practice
even if conducted before a so-called administrative board or commission. It is the character of
the act, and not the place where it is performed, which is the decisive factor.
Id.; see also, e.g., De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 144 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Mo. 1940) (en banc); Carlson
v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 765 N.W.2d 691, 703 (N.D. 2009).
241. E.g., Westmoreland Cnty. v. RTA Group, Inc., 767 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001);
Clark v. Cambria Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 747 A.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
242. See Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d
1262, 1265-66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he doctrine of champerty continues to be viable in this
Commonwealth and can be raised as a defense.”).
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funds to pay the litigation costs; and third, the agreement must entitle the
party to a percentage of the proceeds, suggesting a profit motive. 243
In three successive cases spanning four years, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court barred the same tax consultant from representing property owners before two different county boards. 244 Over the years, the tax
consultant had solicited several taxpayers to enter into contingency fee
agreements. 245 The fee agreement provided for a specified percentage of
the client’s tax savings as a fee, 246 generally 100 percent of the tax savings
in the first year. 247 In some instances, the consultant paid the costs of litigation, including the fees of an appraisal witness and if necessary, legal counsel. 248 The tax consultant retained sole authority249 to hire an attorney, who
had no contact with the property owners. 250 The consultant advised clients
how to deal with real estate tax bills pending the outcome of an appeal. 251
In all three cases, the county boards argued that the tax consultant had engaged in champerty and maintenance as well as the unauthorized practice
of law. The court agreed. 252
Although the fee percentage varies, the terms and conditions of the tax
consulting agreements addressed in the Pennsylvania cases are typical of
the agreements tax consultants have used for many years.253 For states that
continue to recognize the common law doctrine of champerty, whether as a
cause of action or as a contract defense, tax consultant agreements appear
to meet all three elements. First, a tax consultant who solicits unrelated
property owners to enter into these agreements has no legitimate interest in
the property itself or in the tax appeal. Second, the tax consultant typically
agrees to bear the costs of the litigation, including filing fees, expenses for
243. See id.; RTA Group, 767 A.2d at 1148; Clark, 747 A.2d at 1245. “[C]hamperty has long been
considered repugnant to public policy against profiteering and speculating in litigation and grounds for
denying the aid of the court.” Clark, 747 A.2d at 1245-46.
244. See RTA Group, 767 A.2d at 1151; Clark, 747 A.2d at 1247; Westmoreland Cnty. v. Rodgers,
693 A.2d 996, 997 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). The court also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain property tax appeals the consultant had filed on behalf of several clients because he was
not the real party in interest. Rodgers, 693 A.2d at 999; see also Pa. R. Civ. P. 2002.
245. See RTA Group, 767 A.2d at 1146-47; Clark, 747 A.2d at 1244, 1247; Rodgers, 693 A.2d at
997.
246. Rodgers, 693 A.2d at 997-998.
247. Clark, 747 A.2d at 1247.
248. Rodgers, 693 A.2d at 997-998.
249. Clark, 747 A.2d at 1247.
250. Rodgers, 693 A.2d at 997-998.
251. Id. at 998.
252. See RTA Group, 767 A.2d at 1149-51; Rodgers, 693 A.2d at 998-99. In Rodgers, the Commonwealth Court did not address the champerty issue. 693 A.2d at 998-99 & nn.6, 10. However, the
court later interpreted its opinion to have affirmed the trial court’s finding on both issues. See Clark,
747 A.2d at 1246 n.8.
253. See Appendix B for representative examples of tax consulting agreements.
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expert witnesses, and even legal fees if necessary to pursue an appeal beyond the informal administrative level.254 Finally, whenever the consideration is a percentage share of the anticipated tax savings, the agreement
entitles the tax consultant to a percentage share of the litigation proceeds,
suggesting a profit-making motive. 255
B. Unenforceability of Agreements as Contrary to Public Policy
In some instances, the courts have refused to enforce contracts with
these champertous features on the reasoning that the agreements are void as
against public policy, rather than referring to them specifically as contracts
of champerty or maintenance. 256 For example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court agreed in dicta that a contract was contrary to public policy because a
non-attorney appraiser had solicited clients to challenge property assessments in consideration for one-third of any tax savings over a three-year
period. 257 Nevertheless, the court held that the possible illegality of the
agreement was not a bar to the taxpayer’s action seeking a valuation reduction for his marina, which all parties agreed had been overvalued. 258 The
court emphasized the tension between the public policy against lending aid
to illegal contracts and the overriding public policy concern for just taxation. 259 This trend is consistent with those jurisdictions, like Florida, that
no longer recognize common law claims for champerty and maintenance
but do continue to recognize them as contract defenses. 260
Most recently, a New York appellate court addressed a challenge to
the legality of property owners’ “tax reduction representation” agreements
254. An issue beyond the scope of this article is whether these agreements are unlawful because
they provide for fee-splitting between lawyers and non-lawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2012); e.g., Mich. Prof. Jud. Eth. Comm. Op. RI-104 (Oct. 31, 1991), available at
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-104.cfm? (law firm’s agreement to pay
independent contractor consultant a contingency share of tax savings realized by clients in appeals
before tax tribunal violated rules against sharing legal fees with non-lawyers).
255. See Clark, 747 A.2d at 1245; see also Fleetwood Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d 1268, 1272-73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). An argument might be made that
valuation appeals do not result in monetary proceeds to the taxpayer client but rather a reduction in the
assessed property value. However, if the property owner has paid taxes under protest and seeks a refund, this element would clearly be met. Moreover, the focus should be whether the consultant has a
profit motive rather than the measure of calculated “savings.”
256. See Radin, supra note 210, at 67 n.73.
257. See Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460, 461-62 (Conn. 2000) (dicta).
258. See id. at 462-64. The Town had contracted with a private company to revalue all real property in the jurisdiction. The opinion did not address the terms of the agreement between the Town and the
company it commissioned to conduct the revaluation. See id. at 462.
259. Id. at 464-65.
260. E.g., Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1109, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (doctrine of
champerty viable only as defense to contract enforcement, but damages may be recovered for abuse of
process, wrongful initiation of litigation, or malicious prosecution).

2014]

THE PROPERTY TAX NETHERWORLD

327

with a real estate broker. 261 The agreements provided for representation in
negotiations and proceedings before the town’s tax assessor or board of
assessors, as well as any subsequent judicial appeals. A contingency fee
was due only if the proceedings were successful.262 After the board of assessors denied the requested reductions, the broker retained an attorney to
initiate judicial review. 263
The town argued that the representation agreements were champertous, or alternatively that they purported to authorize the broker to engage
in the unauthorized practice of law.264 The trial court agreed and dismissed
the action. But the Appellate Division held that the agreements were not
champertous as a matter of law. In New York, a finding of champerty requires that “the foundational intent to sue on [the claim acquired] must at
least have been the primary purpose for, if not the sole motivation behind,
entering into the transaction.” 265 The court found no evidence supporting
this element because it was in the broker’s financial interest to resolve the
tax disputes through negotiation or administrative proceedings, without
incurring legal expenses by pursuing judicial review. 266
Nevertheless, the court invalidated the agreements because they purported to authorize the broker to represent property owners in court, and
therefore impinged on the practice of law. 267 It was irrelevant that an attorney had been retained to appear in court because the attorney was under the
broker’s “domination and control.” 268 Therefore, the trial court properly
dismissed the appeals, not because they were champertous but because the
broker lacked authority to seek judicial review on behalf of his clients. 269
C. Unauthorized Practice of Law
As observed in the discussion of champerty and maintenance, courts
and state bar associations have struggled with the issue of tax consultants
engaging in unauthorized practice of law by representing property owners

261. Barthel v. Town of Hurley, 739 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
262. Id. at 754-755.
263. Id. at 755.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting Bluebird Partners v. First Fid. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 581, 587 (N.Y. 2000)) (alteration in original).
266. Id. at 755-756.
267. Id. at 756.
268. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Trojan Realty Corp. v. Purdy, 162 N.Y.S. 56, 60 (N.Y. App. Div.
1916)).
269. Id.
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in disputing property tax assessments. 270 While a full treatment of the issue
is beyond the scope of this article, the courts have sometimes reasoned that
contracts not otherwise void as champertous are nevertheless contrary to
public policy if the tax consultant engages in services requiring a license to
practice law. 271 The issue has received a good deal of attention from state
bar associations and attorneys general, but almost no legal scholarship has
addressed the issue. 272
In one representative case, the court refused to enforce a contingency
fee contract between a property owner and a non-attorney licensed realtor,
who had been engaged to secure a reduction in the property owner’s tax
assessment. 273 The court held that the agreement amounted to the unauthorized practice of law, even though the realtor had engaged an attorney to
appear before the county tax board for a share of the realtor’s fifty percent
contingency fee. 274 The court reasoned,
Such circumstances . . . operate not to relieve the [tax consultant], but
only to embroil the attorney in the illegal scheme. If such subterfuge
were permitted, it would result in a destruction of the confidential relationship that an attorney bears to his client. It would permit one not a
lawyer to be engaged in the business of handling legal matters for others.
A layman could spend his time making contacts and obtaining ‘clients,’
conduct all negotiations with them, and then retain lawyers unknown to
the ‘clients,’ to perform the legal work. It would mean that a corporation
would be free to engage in the practice of law. 275

The same reasoning applies to tax consulting agreements authorizing the
consultant to retain an attorney to litigate the claim in the event of a judicial
appeal. 276
Once again, states have taken different approaches to the unauthorized
practice of law issue.277 In some instances, state attorneys general and bar
270. E.g., Stack v. P.G. Garage, Inc., 80 A.2d 545, 546 (N.J. 1951); Krier v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of
Revision, 654 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); see also Thomas J. McNulty, UPL and Property
Tax Assessment Appeals in Illinois, 88 ILL. B.J. 710 (2000); Unauthorized Prac. of Law Comm. Op. 98101, 130-131 (Pa. Bar Ass’n, 5th ed. 1998), available at http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/
UNA01/Opinions/Opinions.asp (opining that tax consultants engage in unauthorized practice of law by
representing property owners before county assessment boards) [hereinafter Pa. Bar Op. 98-101].
271. E.g., Barthel, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
272. Cf. McNulty, supra note 270, at 710; Thomas J. McNulty, Unlicensed Practice of Law Issues
in Property Tax Assessment Appeals—The Debate Continues, 56 TAX TRENDS no. 10, Apr. 2013, at 1,
1-3 (practitioner author).
273. Stack, 80 A.2d at 546.
274. Id. at 546-47.
275. Id. at 547.
276. See Barthel, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 773; Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Attorneys Working
with Property Tax Consultants May Face Ethics Issues, 3 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 20
(Mar.–Apr. 1993).
277. See McNulty, supra note 270, at 716 & n.45 (citing cases). Compare Clark v Cambria Cnty.
Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 747 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (contingency fee agreement
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associations have issued opinions declaring that tax consultants may not
represent property owners before administrative tax tribunals because the
practice amounts to unauthorized practice of law. 278 Several courts have
held that non-attorneys may not appear in court on behalf of property owners, even if the tax consultant retains an attorney to appear in court on the
property owners’ behalf. 279 While an individual property owner may appear pro se, a corporation, as an artificial legal entity, cannot initiate litigation or appear in court except by a corporate officer or other
representative. 280 The courts reserve authority over anyone who appears on
behalf of a client, including a corporation or other legal entity, and who
engages in activities akin to legal practice.
In Ohio, a series of appellate court decisions have addressed whether
non-attorneys may appear on behalf of property owners before county
boards of revision and under what circumstances. In 1994, in Krier v.
Franklin County Board of Revision, 281 the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
a tax consultant who had been retained for a fifty percent contingency fee
could not invoke the local board’s jurisdiction on behalf of an unrelated
property owner. 282 Three years later, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed
Krier in Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking County Board of Revision, 283 holdwith tax consultant who controlled tax litigation unenforceable as unauthorized practice of law and
champerty), with Ky. State Bar Ass’n v. Bailey, 409 S.W.2d 530, 530-531 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (accountant held in contempt for unauthorized practice of law by representing clients in matters involving
statutory interpretation and constitutional law), and Grand Partners Joint Venture I v. Realtax Res., Inc.,
483 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (enforcing contract with consultant who secured value reduction from $75 to $51 million at the local level; statute permits taxpayers to appear by authorized agent),
and In re Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 777 (Tenn. 1995) (upholding statute permitting representation by non-attorney agents absent evidence that representation requires professional legal judgment).
Cf. Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A National Tax Bar: An End to the Attorney-Accountant
Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 16-17 (2004) (addressing issues involving practice of law by
accountants).
278. E.g., Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 93-100 (July 26, 1993) (“[W]hile a duly authorized representative may participate in the proceedings, a non-attorney representative may not engage in
the unauthorized practice of law.”); Pa. Bar Op. 98-101, supra note 270 (tax consultants engage in
unauthorized practice of law by appearing before various county assessment boards).
279. E.g., Barthel, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 773; Westmoreland Cnty. v. Rodgers, 693 A.2d 996, 997-998
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). Cf. Interstate N. Sporting Club v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 551
S.E.2d 91, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (filing notice with county board requesting certification of appeal to
superior court was not unauthorized practice of law).
280. See Bd. of Educ. of Worthington City Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Revision, 707 N.E.2d 499, 502
(Ohio 1999) (non-lawyer corporate officer’s verification and signature on assessment complaint prepared and filed by legal counsel did not amount to unauthorized practice of law).
281. 654 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
282. Id. at 127. Krier is a classic example of a tax consultant who purports to represent property
owners in ad valorem tax proceedings. Observing that “the contesting of real estate valuations has
become somewhat of a cottage industry in Ohio,” the court emphasized, “Although it may have become
customary for non-attorneys to practice before the [Board of Revision ], it is clear that this has become
an aberrant custom, leading to an abuse of the [tax assessment] system.” Id. at 125.
283. 678 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio 1997).
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ing that a tax consultant had engaged in unauthorized practice of law by
filing a complaint with the county board of revision. 284
In Dayton Supply & Tool Co. v. Montgomery County Board of Revision, 285 the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a non-attorney corporate officer may appear before a local board of revision representing a
corporation without engaging in unauthorized law practice. While a statute 286 had been amended to specifically authorize corporate officers to file
tax appeals on behalf of their corporate principals, the court held that the
statute did not control because the courts are exclusively responsible for
regulating the practice of law. 287 Nevertheless, the court concluded:
[A] corporate officer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law
by preparing and filing a complaint and presenting the claimed value of
the property before the board of revision on behalf of [the] corporation,
so long as the officer does not make legal arguments, examine witnesses,
or undertake other tasks that can be performed only by an attorney. 288

Recently the Ohio Supreme Court has further relaxed its position with
respect to appearances by non-lawyers. In Columbus City School District
Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision, 289 the court
held, consistent with a statutory amendment, that a property owner’s
spouse may appear without engaging in unauthorized practice of law.290
And most recently, in Marysville Exempted Village Local School District
Board of Education v. Union County Board of Revision, 291 the court upheld
the amended statute that authorized salaried corporate employees to file tax
appeals on behalf of their principals. 292 The court found “ample precedent
for exercising deference to laws or policies that, in properly limited contexts, authorize non-lawyers to engage in activities that fall into the broad
category of the practice of law.” 293 The court thus deferred to the statute
authorizing narrow exceptions to allow specific individuals to file property
tax disputes on behalf of others, while otherwise reserving its constitutional

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 936.
856 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio 2006).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.19(A)(1)(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
Dayton Supply & Tool, 856 N.E.2d at 931-32.
Id. at 928.
983 N.E.2d 1285 (Ohio 2012) (4-3 decision).
Id. at 1292 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.19(A)(1)).
991 N.E.2d 1134 (Ohio 2013).
Id. at 1142 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.19(A)(1)).
Id. at 1141.
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authority to regulate conduct before boards of revision that amounts to the
practice of law. 294
IV. LEGAL AND ETHICAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CONTINGENCY FEES
Contingent fees are neither good nor bad. They are good when they assist an otherwise helpless litigant to secure his right against a powerful
antagonist. They are bad when they deprive this litigant of a substantial
part of the compensation for his injury. 295

A. Prohibition Against Contingency Fees for Expert Witness Testimony
In most states, an expert witness may not receive a contingency fee.296
It is “a settled principle of American law [that] expert witnesses should not
receive contingent fees.” 297 If the tax consultant agrees to a contingency
fee arrangement, most jurisdictions bar the consultant from testifying as an
expert, assuming the tax tribunal or the court is aware of the contingent
nature of the fee agreement and has authority to enforce the prohibition.298
Consequently, the typical tax consulting agreement authorizes the consultant to appoint expert witnesses to testify on behalf of the property owner. 299 The fee arrangement may raise issues about whether the nature of the
retained expert’s compensation taints the testimony.
Some courts do not permit even a salaried employee of a contingency
fee tax-consulting firm to testify as an expert. 300 But others hold that expert
testimony is not precluded absent proof that the witness personally is com294. See id.; Dayton Supply & Tool Co. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 856 N.E.2d 926,
933 (Ohio 2006) (public-interest factors justified exception for corporate officers representing their own
corporations).
295. Radin, supra note 210, at 75.
296. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (2012); see, e.g., Ethics Op. No. 553, 67
TEX. B.J. 982, 982 (Dec. 2004) (tax consultant cannot testify as expert witness if paid contingency fee
based on outcome of tax proceeding); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 468 N.E.2d
263, 267 (Mass. 1984) (majority rule bars expert witness from recovering compensation contingent on
outcome of controversy).
297. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment, 947 P.2d 1373, 1379 (Colo. 1997). “Case law
on the subject is sparse because this precept has such wide acceptance . . . . [A]n expert witness whose
fee is contingent upon the outcome is improperly motivated and cannot objectively inform the court on
an issue about which the court needs additional instruction.” Id.
298. E.g., id. at 1376, 1378 (independent appraisal testimony based on contingency fee agreement
is contrary to COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-712(1)(b) (1991 & 1996 Supp.) and public policy. But cf.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-702(2.5) (2013) (“Nothing in this subsection (2.5) shall be construed to
preclude a person from acting as an expert witness in valuation appeals.”).
299. See representative tax consultant agreements in Appendix B.
300. City & Cnty. of Denver, 947 P.2d at 1379-80; see also Ethics Op. No. 553, supra note 296, at
982 (“The payment of a contingent fee to an entity that is the employer of an expert witness clearly
comes within the prohibition of Rule 3.04(b) [of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct]”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (precluding “offer[ing] an inducement to a
witness that is prohibited by law”).
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pensated contingent on the outcome, even if the witness’s employer firm
agrees to a contingency fee arrangement. 301 Some courts have held that the
testimony of an expert witness who has agreed to a contingency fee may
not be absolutely disregarded for that reason alone, but those courts will
consider the nature of the compensation in weighing the expert’s credibility. 302
B. Statutory Prohibitions Against Contingency Fees
for Independent Appraisal Assignments
Under federal statutes and regulations, contingency fee appraisals are
unlawful in federally related transactions.303 However, those federal restrictions by their terms do not apply to property tax valuations in state and
local tax proceedings because they have no relationship to federal transactions. Nevertheless, some state legislatures have enacted specific requirements paralleling the federal law by prohibiting contingent fees for
“independent appraisal assignments.” 304 In Colorado, for example, the
courts have interpreted the state statute to preclude appraisers and appraisal
firms from appearing as expert witnesses before the Board of Assessment

301. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Houston Laureate Assoc., Ltd., 329 S.W.3d 52, 56 & n.2 (Tex.
App. 2010) (alleged violation of ethical rule prohibiting attorney from offering expert testimony based
on contingency fee did not justify its exclusion; no evidence that witness or his firm was paid a fee
contingent on outcome, even assuming tax consultant who retained expert’s firm was so compensated).
302. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 468 N.E.2d 263, 268 (Mass. 1984). In
dicta, however, the court observed that if the witness did have a contingency fee agreement, it would be
unenforceable. See id. at 267.
303. See 12 U.S.C. § 3339 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 323.4(a) (2013); see also 12 C.F.R. § 323.2(f)
(2013) (defining “federally related transactions” to include any real estate related financial transaction
in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any federally regulated institution either engages
itself or contracts with another party to conduct, and which requires appraiser services). Appraisal
practice for federally related transactions is governed by the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, issued and periodically updated by the Appraisal Foundation. APPRAISAL STANDARDS
BOARD, THE APPRAISAL FOUNDATION, UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE
(2012-2013 ed.), available at http://www.uspap.org/ [hereinafter USPAP]. The Foundation was established in 1987 in response to the need to strengthen appraisal practices in the wake of the widespread
failures in the savings and loans industry. See generally History of the Foundation, THE APPRAISAL
FOUNDATION, https://netforum.avectra.com/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=TAF&WebCode=History
(last visited Nov. 20, 2013). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) and its implementing regulations require real estate appraisals for “federally related transactions” to comply with USPAP. See 12 U.S.C. § 3339; 12 C.F.R. § 323.4(a). Compliance may be required by contract with the client or the intended users of an appraisal; otherwise, compliance is
voluntary. USPAP, supra, at U-6.
304. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-712(1) (2013); see City & Cnty. of Denver, 947 P.2d at 137778, 1380 n.6. In Colorado, however, contingent fees may be charged for “consulting services,” including “counseling and advocacy in regard to property tax assessments and appeals thereof,” as long as the
consultant discloses that a contingent fee may or has been paid. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-702(2.5)
(2013); id. § 12-61-712(1)(d). A consultant may not misrepresent that a “consulting service” is an
“independent appraisal.” Id. § 12-61-712(1)(c).
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Appeals under contingency fee agreements. 305 In addition to Colorado,
numerous states have enacted statutes prohibiting persons from engaging in
independent appraisal assignments based on contingency fees, including
Alabama, 306 Arizona, 307 Georgia, 308 Louisiana, 309 New York, 310 Ohio, 311
Oklahoma, 312 and South Carolina. 313 However, these statutes generally
carve out an exception for “specialty services for which contingent fees
may be accepted.” 314

305. City & Cnty. of Denver, 947 P.2d at 1379.
306. ALA. CODE §§ 34-27A-24, 34-27A-25 (LexisNexis 2010) (contingency fee prohibited for
appraisal assignments in which appraiser serves, or is perceived to serve, as a disinterested third party);
see also id. § 34-27A-23 (licensed real estate appraisers must comply with USPAP).
307. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3636 (2008) (“A state licensed or state certified appraiser may
not accept a fee for an appraisal assignment that is contingent on the appraiser reporting a predetermined estimate, analysis or opinion or that is contingent on the opinion, conclusion or value reached or
on the consequences resulting from the appraisal assignment.”); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323601(2) (Supp. 2013) (defining “appraisal assignment”).
308. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-39A-20(c) (2011). But see id. § 43-39A-20(d) (“An appraiser who
enters into an agreement to perform specialized services may be paid a fixed fee or a fee that is contingent on the results achieved by the specialized services.”); id. § 43-39A-20(e) (“If an appraiser enters
into an agreement to perform specialized services for a contingent fee, this fact shall be clearly stated in
each written and oral report.”); id. § 43-39A-20(f) (licensing, certification, or registration requirements
imposed by “any other law” must be met before performing specialized services).
309. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:3409(A)(4) (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:3410(A) (Supp.
2013) (licensed real estate appraiser required to comply with USPAP). In 2012, the statute was amended to require licensed real estate appraisers to include in the appraisal report “the amount of the appraiser’s fee.” Id. § 37:3410(B). In Louisiana, compensation for an “appraisal assignment” may not include a
contingency fee based on the results of the assignment. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:3392(2) (Supp.
2013).
310. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 160-y (1), (2) (McKinney 2010) (state-certified or licensed appraiser may
not accept contingency fee for “appraisal assignment” but may agree to perform “specialized services”
for contingent fee); see id. § 160-x (2), (3) (distinguishing “appraisal assignment” and “specialized
services” based on whether third parties would perceive appraiser as rendering unbiased analysis,
opinion, or conclusion of value as disinterested third party).
311. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4763.12(B) (LexisNexis 2013) (certificate holder or licensee may
not accept fee for appraisal assignment contingent upon reporting predetermined estimate, analysis, or
opinion; upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached; or upon consequences resulting from
appraisal assignment, but may charge contingent fee based on results achieved by “specialized services,” with required disclosures); see also id. § 4763.01(E), (F) (defining relevant terms).
312. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-728 (West 2010) (certified appraiser may not accept contingent fee for “appraisal assignment” but may do so for performing “specialized services,” with required
disclosures); see id. § 858-703(13), (14) (distinguishing “appraisal assignment” from “specialized
services”).
313. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-60-38 (2011) (requiring board to adopt USPAP standards applicable to
appraiser apprentices and state-licensed and certified appraisers); see also id. § 40-60-20(3), (23) (defining “appraisal assignment” and “specialized services”).
314. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment, 947 P.2d 1373, 1380 n.6 (Colo. 1997); e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-702(2.5), (4.5) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-39A-2(26) (Supp. 2013). For
example, the Colorado statute defines “consulting services” as
services performed by an appraiser that do not fall within the definition of an ‘independent
appraisal’ in subsection (4.5) of this section. “Consulting services” includes . . . valuations,
analyses, and opinions and conclusions given in connection with . . . counseling and advocacy
in regard to property tax assessments and appeals thereof; except that, if in rendering such
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Thus, even in states that have enacted laws in an effort to conform to
the more stringent federal requirements prohibiting contingency fees to
protect against unethical appraisal practices, the scope of those laws typically excludes services provided by property tax consultants. 315 Most states
fail to regulate or prohibit contingency fee agreements between property
tax consultants and their clients. If regulated at all, it is by virtue of state
licensing or regulatory requirements specifically applicable to property tax
consulting services. In the unlikely event that a tax assessment appeal
reaches the courts, the potential for some oversight exists by the qualification of expert witnesses or by judicial authority to preclude unauthorized
practice of law. 316
V. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF TAX CONSULTANTS
A. Federal Regulation and Oversight of
Contingency Fees Paid to IRS Tax Practitioners
Treasury Department Circular No. 230 is a compilation of the regulations governing practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 317 The
regulations govern who may qualify to practice before the IRS and the
United States Tax Court, including attorneys, certified public accountants,
enrolled agents, and registered tax return preparers. 318 An individual must
meet detailed requirements to qualify for practice and periodic renewal,
including minimum educational standards, continuing education, and com-

services the appraiser acts as a disinterested third party, the work shall be deemed an independent appraisal and not a consulting service.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-702(2.5). The difficulty for assessment tribunals and courts, of course, is to
distinguish between “independent appraisal” and “consulting services,” or in some states “specialized
services.”
315. The current version of the USPAP Ethics Rule appears to have extended its prohibition
against contingency fees to “valuation assignments,” not just “appraisal assignments.” See USPAP,
supra note 303, at U-8; see also id. at U-2 (defining “assignment” as “(1) [a]n agreement between an
appraiser and a client to provide a valuation service; or (2) the valuation service that is provided as a
consequence of such an agreement”); id. at U-4 (defining “valuation services” as “services pertaining to
aspects of property value,” including “all aspects of property value . . . including services performed
both by appraisers and by others”) (emphasis added).
316. E.g., City & Cnty. of Denver, 947 P.2d at 1379.
317. TREASURY DEP’T CIRCULAR NO. 230 (REV. 8-2011), REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE
BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 31 C.F.R. subtitle A, pt. 10 (2012).
318. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2012). Individual taxpayers may also appear on their own behalf. Id. at
§ 10.7(a). The regulations were amended in 2009 to apply to tax return preparers. For a critique of the
lack of regulation of tax return preparers before the amendments, see Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, and the Earned Income Credit: The Need to
Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351,
354 (2009) (“The inherent potential for abuse suggests the need for greater oversight.”).
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pliance with ethical rules. 319 The regulations authorize sanctions for violation of the rules governing practice before the IRS, including censure, suspension, or disbarment. 320
In 2008, the IRS amended its regulations governing the fees its practitioners may charge their clients. 321 Since 1966, the regulations have prohibited unconscionable fees. 322 In 1994, the IRS amended the regulations
to bar contingency fees in some circumstances, including the filing of original returns.323 As the IRS announced in proposing the most recent rule
amendments, “[t]he primary rationales behind the prohibition on contingent
fees is [sic] to preclude any fee arrangement that is related to or requires a
favorable ruling by the IRS and that has the potential to exploit the audit
selection process or compromise a practitioner’s duty of independent
judgment.” 324
The most recent version of Circular 230 broadens the prohibition
against contingent fees. Effective 2009, a practitioner generally “may not
charge a contingent fee for services rendered in connection with any matter
before the Internal Revenue Service.”325 Narrow exceptions allow contingency fees for services related to IRS audits of original returns, amended
returns filed within 120 days after notice of an audit, refund claims based
on assessed interest or penalties, or any judicial proceeding involving an
IRS matter. 326

319. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.5-10.6; id. pt. 10, subpt. B.
320. Id. § 10.50.
321. Id. § 10.27 (effective Mar. 26, 2008).
322. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.27(a); Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,776
(Aug. 13, 1966) (then codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.28). Before 1966, the regulation prohibited “unreasonable” fees. See id. at 10,773.
323. See Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 31,525 (June
20, 1994) (then codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, pt. 10).
324. Contingent Fees Under Circular 230, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,183, 37,184 (July 28, 2009) (emphasis
added) (then codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). The pre-amendment version of the regulation read as follows:
(b) Contingent fees for return preparation.
A practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for preparing an original return. A practitioner
may charge a contingent fee for preparing an amended return or a claim for refund (other than
a claim for refund made on an original return) if the practitioner reasonably anticipates at the
time the fee arrangement is entered into that the amended return or claim will receive substantive review by the Service. A contingent fee includes a fee that is based on a percentage of the
refund shown on a return or a percentage of the taxes saved, or that otherwise depends on the
specific result attained.
31 C.F.R. § 10.28(b) (2001) (amended 2009).
325. 31 C.F.R. § 10.27(b) (2012).
326. Id. § 10.27(b)(2)-(4). The amended regulation broadly defines “contingent fee” to include
“any fee arrangement in which the practitioner will reimburse the client for all or a portion of the client’s fee in the event that a position taken on a tax return or other filing is challenged by the Internal
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The IRS regulations restricting contingency fees were recently challenged on constitutional grounds in an action filed by a Texas-based tax
consulting firm327 that claims its property tax practice is the largest in the
United States. 328 The firm and its principal argued that the general prohibition against contingency fees violates the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 329 Specifically, they claimed that the restrictions hamper the tax consulting business, which represents clients on a contingency fee basis. 330
The trial court dismissed both constitutional challenges. 331 With respect to the Due Process challenge, the plaintiffs lacked standing for failure
to show any injury consistent with the asserted legal theory. 332 With respect to the Petition Clause argument, the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. 333 The court agreed with the government’s argument that the
regulations on contingency fees do not preclude taxpayers from filing refund claims; they only limit the method of compensating a tax practitioner
if the taxpayer elects to retain one. 334
B. State Regulation and Oversight of
Property Tax Consulting Fees and Practice
In contrast to the federal statutes and regulations that restrict contingency fees for appraisers in federally related transactions 335 and, as a general rule, for IRS tax practitioners, very few states impose any significant
regulations on the practice of property tax consultants. Even fewer restrict
or regulate their compensation. Only South Carolina has enacted a statute,
akin to the federal regulations, that clearly bars a property tax practitioner
Revenue Service or is not sustained.” Id. at § 10.27(c)(1). The regulation also defines “matter before the
Internal Revenue Service” quite broadly. See id. at § 10.27(c)(2).
327. Ryan, LLC v. Lew, 934 F. Supp. 2d 159, 159 (D.D.C. 2013).
328. See RYAN, PROPERTY TAX 2 (2013), available at http://www.ryan.com/Assets/Downloads/
Brochures/Property-Tax.pdf. For a description of Ryan LLC, its lucrative tax practice, and its extensive
political connections, see Louise Story, Lines Blur as Texas Gives Industries a Bonanza, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/us/winners-and-losers-intexas.html?pagewanted
=all &_r=0.
329. Ryan, LLC, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 160. The Petition Clause prohibits laws “abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
330. 934 F. Supp. 2d at 160. The third count alleged that IRS exceeded its authority in amending
the regulations, contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 169.
333. Id. at 171-74.
334. Id. at 173. The court did not address the third count because it was not the subject of the
government’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Administrative Procedure Act challenge remains pending. See id. at 174.
335. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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from charging an unconscionable fee; the statute applies even to practice
before local assessment boards. Further, no other state except South Carolina generally prohibits property tax consultants from entering into contingency fee agreements.
While in theory the courts presumably have authority to consider the
reasonableness of a tax consultant’s fee, as a practical matter judicial oversight is highly unlikely. For all but the most well-heeled property owners,
challenging the enforceability of a fee agreement in court would be intimidating and cost-prohibitive, especially when the contingency fee is generally calculated not as a percentage of any cash refund, but rather as a
percentage of the anticipated tax savings for the ensuing tax year. And most
clients are unlikely to challenge the fee provisions as unenforceable. To the
relatively unsophisticated property owner, even an exorbitant contingency
fee percentage appears to be a “good deal” if the tax consultant’s services
yield a tax break, even if the property owner realizes only half the anticipated tax savings. 336 Moreover, when courts have had occasion to consider
the reasonableness of tax consultant fees, as when a tax consultant sues to
recover the fee from a recalcitrant client, the courts have been remarkably
amenable to enforcing the agreements by their terms, often without questioning the reasonableness of the fee. 337
A few states have enacted statutes or regulations that specifically apply to services offered by property tax consultants. Appendix A provides a
state-by-state overview. As it reflects, the great majority of states lack any
statutes or rules imposing minimum qualifications or standards for nonattorneys who engage in property tax consulting. Nor do they regulate the
terms of the agreements or the fees tax consultants charge to clients. A few
states have enacted comprehensive regulatory statutes and regulations that
provide some oversight of property tax consultants, but very few states
curtail the common practice of charging contingency fees.

336. Unless the property owner has already paid the challenged taxes under protest, no res is
available from which to pay the contingency fee. Most tax consulting agreements provide that the
property owner is responsible for paying a contingency fee based upon the reduction in assessed value,
multiplied by the most recently available tax rate. See example contracts in Appendix B. Once the tax
consultant succeeds in achieving a reduced assessed value, the property owner is invoiced for the
contingency fee, which may occur several months before any tax bill is issued based on the reduced
assessment.
337. E.g., Strategis Asset Valuation & Mgmt., Inc. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 1544,
1551 (D. Colo. 1992); Prop. Assessment Review, Inc. v. Greater Mo. Builders, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 841,
848 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); cf. Miller v. Botwin, 899 P.2d 1004, 1009-10 (Kan. 1995) (property tax
attorney).
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The following five states have taken leading roles in regulating the
property tax consulting practice. Appendix A provides summary information for these and other states.
1. Indiana
Within certain constraints, Indiana law338 regulates the practice of
property tax consultants, known as “tax representatives.” 339 As authorized
by statute, the Indiana Board of Tax Review has adopted regulations governing the practice of non-lawyers in property tax proceedings. Practice is
broadly defined to include “participation in any matters connected with a
presentation to the [Indiana Board of Tax Review] or any of its members or
employees relating to a client’s rights, privileges, or liabilities under Indiana’s property tax laws or rules.” 340
To qualify for practice, the tax representative must be certified by the
Indiana Department of Local Government Finance and secure a power of
attorney from the taxpayer client. 341 A certified tax representative may not
assert tax exemption claims, arguments that taxes or assessments are contrary to law, constitutional challenges, or any other matter that would involve the practice of law. 342 The regulations prohibit a variety of unethical
conduct and specifically address contingent fees.343 While not prohibiting
or restricting them, the regulations provide that a “tax representative who
charges a contingent fee may not testify without first disclosing the existence of the contingent fee arrangement.” 344 Failure to disclose entitles the
board to presume that a contingent fee arrangement exists.345 Finally, the
statute provides for denial, suspension, or revocation of certification under
specific circumstances, which include violation of any rule of practice,

338. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.5-6-1(a) (LexisNexis 2007). “[T]he Indiana board shall adopt
rules . . . to govern the practice of representatives in proceedings before the Indiana board under this
article.” However, the statutes preclude any regulations that restrict practice merely because the representative is not an Indiana-licensed lawyer, id. § 6-1.5-6-1(b)(1), or that “restrict the admissibility of the
written or oral testimony of a representative or other witness . . . based upon the manner . . . compensated,” id. § 6-1.5-6-1(b)(2).
339. 52 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-1-6 (2013) (defining “tax representative”).
340. Id. 1-1-4 (defining “practice before the board”).
341. Id. 1-2-1(a).
342. Id. 1-2-1(b).
343. Id. 1-2-2 to -4.
344. Id. 1-2-4(a). “Contingent fee” is defined to include “a fee, whether accruing to the tax representative or to the entity with which the tax representative is affiliated, that is based on a percentage of
the: (1) refund obtained; (2) taxes saved; or (3) reduction in assessed value.” Id. at § 1-2-4(b).
345. 52 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-4(c) (2013).
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gross incompetence, dishonesty, or fraud while practicing before the board,
or violation of any standards of ethics or rules pertaining to solicitation. 346
2. Tennessee
Tennessee requires registration of property tax agents who appear before the state board of equalization. 347 The governing statute begins by
providing that “taxpayers and assessors of property shall be entitled to the
assistance of a qualified agent and of such other persons as they may wish”
in proceedings before the state board of equalization. 348 The statute explicitly does not regulate practice before local boards of equalization.349 The
statute next identifies those who may appear before the state board and
participate as a taxpayer agent: an attorney; a regular officer, director, or
employee of a taxpayer corporation or other artificial entity; a certified
public accountant if the sole issue is the valuation of personal property; or a
registered agent for classification or assessment disputes. 350
To qualify as a registered agent, the statute requires four years of experience either appraising real property or valuing it for assessment purposes. In addition, for those seeking registration on or after July 1, 2002,
120 hours of additional instruction are required in property appraisal or
assessment, as well as successful passage of an examination administered
by the board. 351
The statute provides the board with broad power to “reprimand, revoke, or suspend from practice or place on probation or otherwise discipline any agent” for specified acts, 352 and authorizes the board to adopt
additional rules of conduct when an agent appears before the board.353
Moreover, non-attorney agents who solicit clients must explicitly disclose
that they may appear only on matters of classification, assessment, or valuation, and that they may not represent clients in court. 354 Finally, the statute
establishes a “regulatory panel” composed of six registered agents, which
may adopt standards of conduct applicable to all agents subject to board

346. Id. 1-2-5.
347. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-1514(c)(1)(D), (2), (3) (2013).
348. Id. § 67-5-1514(a).
349. Id. § 67-5-1514(j).
350. Id. § 67-5-1514(c)(1)(D); see id. § 67-5-1407(a).
351. Id. § 67-5-1514(c)(2).
352. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-1514(f)(1) (2013).
353. Id. § 67-5-1514(f)(2).
354. Id. § 67-5-1514(g).
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approval. Upon a two-thirds affirmative vote, the panel may impose disciplinary action against any registered agent. 355
The board has adopted regulations consistent with the authority conferred by statute, 356 including standards of conduct. 357 The rules provide
that “[an] agent shall not contract for or accept compensation or anything
of value for services not performed,” 358 but the rules otherwise neither
regulate an agent’s compensation nor preclude contingency fee agreements.
3. Arizona
In order to practice in Arizona, property tax agents 359 must register
with the State Board of Appraisal; if approved, registration is for a twoyear period. 360 Statutes provide basic rules of conduct, 361 the violation of
which may trigger an investigation and possible sanctions. 362 Arizona Supreme Court rules governing the unauthorized practice of law explicitly
exclude property tax agents registered with the Board of Appraisal who
practice as authorized and within the scope of those statutes. 363
The Arizona State Board of Appraisal is authorized to adopt regulations to administer the statute, and it has done so by adopting formal
“standards of practice.” 364 Among other things, the standards prohibit a
property tax agent from “[a]ssigning, accepting, or performing a tax assignment that is contingent upon producing a predetermined analysis or
conclusion;” 365 “[i]ssuing an appraisal analysis or opinion . . . that fails to
355. Id. § 67-5-1514(f)(3). An appeal may be taken to the Board of Equalization, which must
affirm by a two-thirds majority to impose discipline on a registered agent. Id.
356. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0600-01 to -09 (2011).
357. Id. at 0600-06-.06.
358. Id. at 0600-06-.06(8).
359. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-3601(14), 32-3651(4) (Supp. 2013) (both defining “property tax agent”).
360. Id. § 32-3651(4); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3652(A), (B) (Supp. 2013).
361. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3653 (Supp. 2013). A property tax agent:
1. Shall not knowingly misrepresent any information or act in a fraudulent manner.
2. Shall not prepare documents or provide evidence in a property valuation or legal classification appeal unless the agent is authorized by the property owner to do so and any required
agency authorization form has been filed.
3. Shall not knowingly submit false or erroneous information in a property valuation or legal
classification appeal.
4. Shall use appraisal standards and methods that are adopted by the board when the agent
submits appraisal information in a property valuation or legal classification appeal. Id.
362. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3654 (2008).
363. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 31(26).
364. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3655 (2008); see ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-46-601 to -602
(2013).
365. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-46-601(6). “Tax assignment” is not defined. By statute, a statelicensed or certified appraiser may not perform an “appraisal assignment” for a contingency fee. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3636 (2008). But “appraisal assignment” is defined as “an engagement for which
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disclose bias or the accommodation of a personal interest;” 366 “[p]romoting
a tax agent practice and soliciting assignments by using misleading or false
advertising;” 367 “[s]oliciting a tax assignment by assuring a specific result
or by stating a conclusion on the assignment without first analyzing the
facts;” 368 and performing an “appraisal,” as defined by statute, 369 unless
the property tax agent is also a board-certified or licensed appraiser. 370
By rule, the Board has formally adopted the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, which apply to all “appraisals” conducted
in Arizona but do not apply to property tax agents or their reports. 371 None
of the Arizona statutory or regulatory standards of conduct otherwise governs the compensation a property tax agent may require for services to a
property owner. 372
4. South Carolina
Unlike most states, South Carolina statutes govern the administrative
tax assessment process before both local and state officials. 373 The same
persons authorized to represent taxpayers before the IRS may represent
taxpayers during the state and local administrative tax process. 374 In addition, for matters limited exclusively to the valuation of real property, a
state-registered, licensed, or certified real estate appraiser may represent the
taxpayer. 375 The statute authorizes suspension, disbarment, or monetary
penalties under certain circumstances, including incompetence, failure to

a real estate appraiser is employed or retained to act, or would be perceived by third parties or the
public in acting, as a disinterested third party in rendering an unbiased analysis, opinion or conclusion.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3601(2) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). Because property tax agents are
advocates, this definition would not apply; nor, by implication, does the prohibition against contingent
fees. Moreover, Chapter 36 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which governs licensed and certified
appraisers, expressly excludes “[a] property tax agent who is registered in this state and who, when
acting as such, prepares a report analyzing real estate if the report is made for purposes of tax assessment or tax valuation of the real estate.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3602(7) (2008).
366. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-46-601(7).
367. Id. § R4-46-601(10).
368. Id. § R4-46-601(11).
369. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3601(1) (Supp. 2013).
370. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-46-601(12).
371. Id. § R4-46-401.
372. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3602(7) (2008); see supra note 365 and accompanying text.
373. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-90(A) (Supp. 2012). “[T]he administrative tax process includes
matters connected with presentation to a state or local tax authority . . . relating to a client’s rights,
privileges, or liabilities pursuant to laws, regulations, or rules administered by state or local tax authorities.” Id. The South Carolina Tax Code was substantially amended in 2007, effective with the 2008 tax
year. See 2007 S.C. Acts 41.
374. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-90(C)(1); see TREASURY DEP’T CIRCULAR NO. 230 (REV. 8-2011),
supra note 317.
375. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-90(C)(2).
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comply with rules, or misrepresentation.376 Subsection E incorporates by
reference the standards of conduct in Circular 230, 377 with appropriate
modifications to make them applicable to property tax returns, property
taxes, and property tax assessments under South Carolina law. 378
By generally incorporating the standards of practice in Circular 230, in
particular § 10.27, South Carolina law precludes property tax consultants
from charging unconscionable fees in connection with any matter before
state or local tax officials. 379 In addition, South Carolina law specifically
prohibits those who represent property owners in tax proceedings from
charging contingent fees for their services, subject to certain exceptions
comparable to those in Circular 230. 380 South Carolina has thus adopted a
progressive statute that broadly regulates those who appear before both
state and local property tax tribunals, including their fees.
5. California
In 1965, as discussed earlier, California was the hotbed of a major
property tax scandal fueled by property tax consultants’ contingency fees
and kickbacks to local assessors. 381 Given that history, one might expect
that California would be among the more progressive states in enacting
regulatory statutes to curb the potential for abuse by property tax consultants.
The California Board of Equalization is granted broad statutory power
to adopt rules and regulations governing local boards of equalization and
assessors. 382 The Board has adopted extensive rules and regulations governing the assessment and equalization of taxable property, including who
may initiate a proceeding and appear on behalf of a property owner. 383
Rule 317 provides that a property owner may appear in person or by
an authorized agent, who must be “thoroughly familiar with the facts pertaining to the matter before the board.” 384 If a non-attorney agent initiates
the proceeding, the application must include written authorization to repre-

376. Id. § 12-60-90(D).
377. Id. § 12-60-90(E). For a brief summary of Circular 230, see supra notes 317-326 and accompanying text.
378. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-90(F).
379. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.27(a) (2012).
380. See id. § 10.27(b)(2), (3), (4).
381. See supra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
382. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15606(c) (West 2009).
383. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 317 (2013).
384. Id. § 317(a).
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sent the property owner.385 A corporation, limited partnership, or limited
liability company may appear by any officer, employee, or authorized
agent if “thoroughly familiar with the facts.” 386 For an individual property
owner, a co-owner or close relative may appear.387 No other regulations
restrict the manner in which a non-attorney agent may represent a property
owner during the proceedings.
California statutes do, however, regulate the solicitation of property
owners by “assessment reduction filing services,” defined as any service
offered for compensation in connection with an application to reduce the
assessment of residential property. 388 A service is prohibited from making
untrue or misleading statements. Specific oral and written disclosures must
be made to the residential property owner that the service is not affiliated
with any government agency, and that the property owner may file on his
own behalf, at no cost. 389 Finally, a filing service may not charge or collect
a fee until after filing a request or application on the property owner’s behalf. 390
On the other hand, current California laws do not regulate the compensation for property tax agents, although efforts have been made to
strengthen them. In 2011, for example, a bill was introduced in the California Legislature that would have enacted a new article comprehensively
regulating property tax agents, including required registration, compliance
with a code of ethics, and a prohibition against charging unconscionable
fees. 391 The author of the bill described its purpose as “to advance the professional practice of tax agents so that they are held to the highest ethical

385. Id. § 305; see Helene Curtis, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Assessment Appeals Bds., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d
658, 665 (Ct. App. 2004) (requiring non-attorney agent to provide written authorization does not exceed
regulatory authority of State Board of Equalization); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17537.9(e)(1)
(West Supp. 2013) (unlawful for assessment reduction filing service to file without written authorization from property owner).
386. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 317(d).
387. Id. § 317(c), (e). “A husband may appear for his wife, or a wife for her husband, and sons or
daughters for parents or vice versa.” Id. § 317(e).
388. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17537.9(d)(1).
389. Id. § 17537.9(b).
390. Id. § 17537.9(c).
391. An Act to Amend Section 17537.9 of the Business and Professions Code, to Amend Section
15640 of the Government Code, and to add Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 1660) to Chapter 1 of
Part 3 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, Relating to Local Government, A.B. 2183,
2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billText
Client.xhtml;jsessionid=10563e267d558f31dfde4c932cd9?bill_id=201120120AB2183.
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standards in California.” 392 Assembly Bill 2183 passed overwhelmingly in
the California Assembly but died in a Senate Committee in late 2012. 393
Also introduced in 2011 was Assembly Bill 404, which would have
required property tax agents to register as lobbyists if they practice in any
county that regulates lobbying. 394 As explained by the author,
[t]his simple requirement would result in disclosure, to the media and the
public, of who is paying so-called “tax agents” to obtain what are, in
some cases, multi-million-dollar windfalls for their clients through favorable treatment by Assessors. It would also, in many cases, prevent tax
agents from making campaign contributions to Assessors, who then hear
the tax agents’ clients’ cases. . . . It seeks to improve the assessment process by ensuring that all citizens are given fair and equal access. 395

Assembly Bill 404 passed the Assembly overwhelmingly but died in the
Senate in late 2012. 396
Finally, Senate Bill 342, also introduced in 2011, would have expressly prohibited contingency fees for services in connection with any matter
before the State Board of Equalization, including property tax appeals.397
The bill’s purpose was to “eliminate the incentive for unregulated consultants to promote aggressive positions on tax returns on a contingency fee
basis.” 398 The bill died in early 2012, having failed to clear the Senate by
the deadline. 399
Thus, even in California, efforts to regulate or restrict the contingency
fees charged by property tax consultants have so far failed.

392. Cal. A.B. 2183: Hearing on A.B. 2103 Before the S. Gov’t & Finance Comm., 2012, 20112012 Sess. 5-6 (statement of Lois Wolk, Chair, S. Gov’t & Finance Comm.), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB2183.
393. Cal. A.B. 2183: History, 2012, 2011-2012 Sess. 1, available at http://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml;jsessionid=10563e267d558f31dfde4c932cd9?bill_id=.
394. An Act to Add Section 23028 to the Government Code, Relating to Local Government, A.B.
404, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill
NavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB404.
395. Cal. A.B. 404: Bill Analysis in S. Floor, - 2012, 2011-2012 Sess. 6, (statement of Gatto,
Member, Assemb.), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201120120AB404.
396. Cal. A.B. 404: History, 2011, 2011-2012 Sess.1-2, available at http://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB404.
397. An Act to Amend Section 19717 of, and to Add Section 41 to, the Revenue and Taxation
Code, Relating to Taxation, S.B. 342, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB342.
398. Cal. S.B. 342: Hearing on S.B. 342 Before the S. Gov’t & Finance Comm., 2011, 2011-2012
Sess. 5 (statement of Lois Wolk, Chair, S. Gov’t & Finance Comm.), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB342.
399. Cal. S.B. 342: History, 2011, 2011-2012 Sess. 1, available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB342.
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CONCLUSION
In the great majority of states, the ubiquitous practice of property tax
consulting, compensated by contingency fees, goes largely unregulated.
Federal laws enacted to reform appraisal practices in the wake of the savings and loans scandals of the late 1980s, including the prohibition against
performing an “appraisal assignment” for a contingency fee, apply only to
federally related transactions. While some states have enacted statutes to
parallel the federal requirements, statutory definitions of the relevant terms
effectively carve out an exception for “specialized” or “consulting” services of the kind typically offered by property tax consultants. In fact, the
typical state statute implicitly or explicitly permits contingency fees for
those services.
While courts have generally condoned contingency fees for attorneys
notwithstanding common law prohibitions against champerty, their reasoning rarely acknowledges that non-lawyers regularly represent property
owners in quasi-judicial tax proceedings compensated by contingency fees,
without judicial or even meaningful administrative oversight. Those fees
typically divert to the tax consultant thirty to fifty percent, and sometimes
more, of the anticipated property tax savings as a result of challenging the
local government’s assessed property value. Even when tax consultants
bring contract enforcement actions before the courts, freedom of contract
principles frequently sway the courts to enforce the agreements, however
onerous or unreasonable the contingency fee calculation. And unless the
property owner refuses to pay the contingency fee and the tax consultant
files a contract enforcement action, most of these agreements never come
to the attention of the courts. That is because the business of property tax
consulting occurs largely in negotiation with local assessors’ offices and
before decentralized administrative tax tribunals.
Courts that have abandoned champerty and maintenance as contract
defenses reason that sufficient safeguards are in place to regulate contingency fees charged by attorneys to their clients. However, judicial safeguards do not apply to non-attorneys, who practice almost exclusively in
administrative tribunals that lack authority to regulate the practice of law
and often lack the statutory authority even to regulate the practice of tax
consultants. Moreover, in the absence of specific authorizing statutes, administrative tribunals, unlike courts, have no power to regulate the compensation paid to those who appear on behalf of property owners.
Moreover, courts themselves lack power to regulate compensation agreements with non-attorneys, unless one of the parties to the contract seeks
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judicial intervention to either enforce the contract or declare it unenforceable.
The common practice of contingency fee agreements between tax assessors and contract auditors on the one hand, and property owners and tax
consultants on the other, creates perverse financial incentives that undermine the integrity of property tax administration. Payment of contingency
fees by the government to outside auditors for identifying undervalued or
escaped property raises due process and ethical concerns. As a matter of
policy, diverting a share of property tax revenues to private third parties for
assessment functions undermines accountability and results in a substantially lower return of escaped taxes to the government coffers. As a result,
honest taxpayers effectively subsidize both the tax dodger and the contract
auditor. And when private tax consultants are permitted to split the property owner’s anticipated tax savings or share in the recovery of erroneously
assessed taxes, the associated high cost of assuring uniformity in tax assessment unduly burdens the entire property tax system.
The current practice of allowing contingency fees for both contract
auditors and tax consultants is economically inefficient, prone to abuse, and
contrary to the public interest. Statutory and regulatory oversight of contract auditors and property tax consultants must be strengthened to eliminate extravagant financial incentives, while providing for reasonable
compensation on a fee-for-service or hourly basis. Ethical standards, educational prerequisites, and disclosure requirements are affirmative ways to
hold the profession to higher expectations. State and local governments
need better and less costly ways of ensuring access to property owners in
order to optimize the accuracy and uniformity of property tax assessments.
The problems associated with contract auditors and property tax consultants are complex, controversial, and politically charged. 400 But those
challenges make even more compelling the need for legal scholars to lend
their expertise in an effort to prevent overreaching by property tax entrepreneurs who have thrived for more than a century in a symbiotic relationship with the “worst tax.” 401

400. “Tax policy is one of most difficult public policy issues to address because it requires recalcitrant and resentful people to pay some of their hard-earned money towards the greater good of funding
civilization.” Susan Pace Hamill, The Vast Injustice Perpetuated by State and Local Tax Policy, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 154 (2008).
401. “[T]he general property tax as actually administered is beyond all doubt one of the worst
taxes known in the civilized world.” EDWIN ROBERT ANDERSON SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 62
(8th ed. 1921).
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APPENDIX A: STATE REGULATION OF
TAX CONSULTANTS AND TAX FERRETS
Tax Consultants
Regulation
Contingency Fees

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

Regulated
Regulated
Limited Regulation;
Disclosure Required

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Tax Ferrets
Regulation
Contingency Fees
Regulated
Prohibited

Prohibited

Prohibited

Limited Regulation

Prohibited

Limited Regulation

Regulated
Regulated

Disclosure Required

Regulated

Disclosure Required

Prohibited

Prohibited
Prohibited

Regulated
Prohibited
Regulated

Prohibited
Prohibited
Prohibited (in Part)

Regulated

Regulated

Prohibited

Prohibited

Regulated
Regulated

Prohibited (in Part)

Regulated

Prohibited

Prohibited

Prohibited

Regulated
Regulated

Prohibited
Prohibited

Limited Regulation

Regulated
Limited Regulation

Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated
Regulated

Prohibited

Prohibited

Limited Regulation

Legend:
No Regulation

Limited Regulation;
Disclosure Required

Regulated

Prohibited
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